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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Historic architectural landmarks in Center City
Philadelphia have been in the past and continue to be the
objects of neglect, improper alteration and demolition.
Cognizant of the importance of preserving historic landmarks,
the Philadelphia City Planning Commission is currently
considering the alteration of the Philadelphia Zoning Code in
a manner that would greatly expedite the protection,
maintenance, and renovation of historic architecture in Center
City Philadelphia. The Planning Commission's proposal would
allow owners of locally-designated historic buildings in
Center City and owners of selected high-rise development sites
in Center City to participate in what is known as a transfer
of development rights (TDR) Program.
The proposed TDR Program would permit the unused zoning
envelope above locally-certified historic buildings to be sold
to developers of high-rise commercial buildings, who would
then be eligible to surpass the base floor-area ratio limits
permitted by zoning on their high-rise development sites. For
every square foot of developable floor area purchased from the
owner of the historic building, the developer of the high-
rise building would be permitted an additional square foot of
floor area above the base floor-area prescribed by zoning.
The transfer would be permanent, and the program would be
designed to ensure that the sale of developments rights would

finance the renovation and long-term maintenance of affected
historic buildings.
TDR implementation would have the significant effect of
linking the development of high-rise office buildings, a
process which is often the nemesis of historic architecture,
with the preservation of selected historic buildings. In so
doing, it would have the equally significant effect of
balancing the competing and conflicting objectives of several
special interest groups, including the residents of Center
City, several City governmental agencies, and the development
and business community.
TDR implementation would actualize this reconciliation
in the following ways.
Residents and affected property owners in Center City
would be pleased with the plan because it would not only
provide for the continued visual enhancement of Center City,
but it would make high-rise developers share in the costs of
preserving landmarks. As opposed to the existing
Preservation Ordinance, which merely provides for designation
and protection of landmark buildings, TDRs would have high-
rise developers compensate property owners for the cost of
maintaining landmark buildings and for the forgone opportunity
of developing property to its highest permitted density. The
severability of development rights from a designated building
would also make it easier for owners of designated historic
buildings to obtain mortgages and other loans, as development

rights could constitute an asset and a form of collateral.
Because TDRs would enable private property owners to get cash
out of their buildings in both of the above-mentioned ways,
it would diminish property owners' objections to designation,
which is currently viewed as financially burdensome.
The government of the City of Philadelphia would be
pleased with a TDR plan for several reasons. First, it would
provide a public amenity at little or no cost to the City, as
the City could further the cause of historic preservation
without acquiring and maintaining historic buildings. Second,
a TDR plan would not diminish the City's tax base. Although
historic buildings which had sold their development rights
under the plan could not be replaced with buildings that
generate greater tax revenue, they would remain on the tax
rolls, and the density transferred to new high-rises that were
involved in a development rights transfer would permit the
taxes to be higher on the new high rise than they would be
otherwise.
The City's Historical Commission would find favor with
the Plan because TDRs could supplement the existing incentives
to retain historic architecture in a part of the city, the
core and periphery of the office core, where historic
buildings are at great risk of being demolished. The
Historical Commission would also find it easier to designate
buildings because they could offer financial compensation as
an accompaniment to designation, which would expedite the

implementation of the City's Preservation Ordinance.
The Planning Commission would be pleased with the plan
because it would divert the floor area in the zoning envelope
of historic buildings directly into the office core, where the
City's infrastructure of streets, subways, expressway
entrances, sewers and sidewalks is large enough to absorb
increased development. This would have the effect of
strengthening the low-density historic character of Center
City neighborhoods and reinforcing as well the fabric of
Philadelphia's business district, two principal objectives
articulated in the Planning Commission's 1988 Plan for Center
City .
The business and development community in Center City
would be pleased by the TDR plan because it would enhance the
prestige of Center City by securing the maintenance of Center
City's historic buildings and by encouraging further high-rise
development
.
The proposed revision of the zoning code is also in
keeping with the national trend toward the use of so-called
"incentive zoning" to finance civic improvements by harnessing
the forces of high-rise real estate development. Cities such
as New York, San Francisco and Denver use incentive zoning to
finance historic preservation and the provision of civic
amenities such as low-income housing, day care, gt alia . This
method of financing civic improvements has become more
important than ever given the reduced role of the federal

government in financing such benevolent enterprises.
Thus, TDR implementation would not only reconcile the
competing objectives of several Center City constituencies;
it is a concept that has been tested in a handful of
circumstances and that has great promise.
However, although the preservation of historic
architecture presents exceptional benefits to Philadelphia,
there exists doubt in Philadelphia's planning, preservation
and business communities that a TDR plan can be successful in
Philadelphia. Opponents to the plan contend, inter alia
, that
TDR plans have a mixed performance record nationally; that the
pace of high-rise construction is not fast enough to generate
demand for the program; that not enough landmarks in Center
City are endangered by high-rise development to necessitate
a TDR plan; that the plan would be unpopular with owners of
historic buildings because it would prevent them from
developing their property to the highest permitted density;
that administering a TDR plan would be too costly for the
City, which costs would not be justified by the benefits
presented by preserving historic landmarks; that existing
zoning bonuses and floor-area limits are already too generous,
thereby obviating any potential demand for a TDR program; and
finally, that existing preservation programs and ordinances
offer enough incentive to maintain and renovate historic
properties and provide enough control over the maintenance of
historic properties to render a TDR program superfluous.

What opponents of the TDR plan do not realize is that,
because the TDR concept has been tested nationally, Center
City's TDR plan can benefit from the experience in other cites
and can be designed to meet the unique character of Center
City, in terms of the pace of high-rise development in Center
City and in terms of the nature of the threat to historic
architecture in Center City. Opponents also do not realize
that a TDR plan can be designed to compensate owners of
designated historic properties for the forgone development
opportunity, so to as satisfy the standards set forth by the
United States Constitution. Opponents' contention that
existing zoning bonuses and floor-area bonuses would obviate
demand for TDRs is true only in the context of the current
comprehensive plan for the City. However, TDR implementation
would only occur in the context of a revision of the
comprehensive plan. Opponents' contention that the benefits
of a TDR plan, namely that of preserving locally-designated
historic buildings, would not outweigh the costs to the City
is wholly misinformed for two reasons. First, the burden for
implementing the plan can fall upon not-for-profit
preservation organizations in Philadelphia that are well-
qualified to assist in the endeavor. Secondly, the benefits
of historic preservation are not entirely quantifiable, but
not even critics of the TDR concept would disagree that the
revitalization of Center City Philadelphia depends to a large
extent upon the implementation of a successful historic

preservation initiative. Thus, the minor costs incurred by the
City in designing and implementing a TDR plan will be
recovered many times over. Finally, a TDR program would not
be redundant with existing preservation incentives and
ordinances; it would compliment and reinforce such programs.
Thus, whereas the prospect of implementing a TDR program
raises challenging financial, legal, planning and
administrative issues which must first be resolved before
implementation can occur, as the discussion of these issues
in the forthcoming chapters demonstrates, its benefits for
Philadelphia will render these obstacles insignificant.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING CENTER CITY LANDMARKS
Implementing a TDR Program in Center City Philadelphia
is an important civic objective because preserving Center
City's historic architecture presents innumerable and long-
lasting benefits to the City of Philadelphia, its citizens,
its businesses and its institutions. These benefits are both
economic and cultural, as landmark preservation directs
investment into Center City, defines Philadelphia's identity
in a positive manner, maintains exalted cultural values, and
is a resource for scholarship.
The Economic Benefits of Preserving Center City Historic
Buildings
Among the economic benefits resulting from the
preservation of historic buildings in Center City Philadelphia
is the fact that they draw visitors into the City from the
suburbs, from around the nation and from around the world.
These visitors bring money into the City, which stimulates the
local economy, providing jobs and creating tax revenue.
Independence National Park's 23 historic buildings, for
instance, drew 5,362,893 visitors in 1988, according to the
Pennsylvania Convention and Visitor's Bureau. (1) Although
figures demonstrating how much these particular tourists spent
in Philadelphia are not available, the total expenditure by
travellers in the City of Philadelphia in 1987 was $2.78
billion, which generated 55,571 jobs, $708 million in payroll
8

and $22.7 million in local tax receipts. (2) Not all of these
benefits can be attributed solely to Philadelphia's
architectural heritage, but the relationship between
Philadelphia's popularity as a tourist destination and its
abundance of restored historic architecture is undeniable and
will become even stronger with the advent of the new
Convention Center at Twelfth and Market Streets. When this
facility is completed, Philadelphia will vaunt its historic
character in its attempt to compete with other cities for a
share of the billion-dollar, national convention industry.
Philadelphia's historic architecture, therefore, is an
economic resource.
The benefits of preserving historic architecture are
evident not only in the tourist and convention industries, but
also in the film industry. Since the establishment of the
Philadelphia Film Office in 1985, nine feature films and over
thirty television projects have been shot in Philadelphia,
resulting in $23 million of economic benefits to the City. (3)
Uniquely Philadelphian landmarks such as the Fidelity Bank
Building at Broad and Samson Streets, the Union League at
Broad and Samson, the Curtis Institute at Eighteenth and
Locust Streets, et alia , all of which are listed on the
National Register of Historic Places, were critical visual
elements in several nationally-released motion pictures.
Janet Herrington, Executive Director of the Film Office,
notes that much of what draws film directors to Philadelphia
9

are Center City's historic neighborhoods and landmark
buildings, which offer a consistently-historic, urban setting,
something found in very few American cities.
The City's efforts to maintain its position as the
regional center of finance, law, insurance, architecture and
other service and information-based industries also
underscores the importance of the City's rich architectural
heritage. Historic buildings are valuable economic resources
for these industries because they provide an air of prestige,
solidity and permanence to the business environment,
attributes which cannot be foiand in the same quantity in any
other office market in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
A final way in which historic buildings constitute an
economic resource is that the ambience they create contributes
heavily to Center City's high quality of life. Because of
Center city's high quality of life, it is one of the few areas
of the City that entices taxpaying and wage-earning residents
from outside the City to move within the City limits. (4)
Attracting new, tax-paying residents has been and will
continue to be a critical factor leading to Center City
Philadelphia's revitalization. As a result of the City's
efforts to promote historic preservation, certain sections of
Center City, i.e. Washington Square West and Society Hill, are
now among the most desirable residential locations in the
region
.
The emerging recognition that the aesthetic
10

characteristics of historic landmarks are in themselves
important economic resources is evident in an excerpt from a
recent Supreme Court decision, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Dieao (U.S. 1980).
"Today, economic and aesthetic considerations
together constitute the nearly inseparable warp and
woof of the fabric upon which the modern city must
design its future." (5)
The Intangible Benefits of Preserving Center City Landmarks
Economic benefits notwithstanding, the preservation of
historic architecture presents intangible benefits to
Philadelphia, as well. The design and craftsmanship of
historic architecture are among the greatest cultural
achievements of and represent the highest standards and
loftiest aspirations of 18th, 19th and 20th century
Philadelphia and American society. The bulk of Center City's
historic architecture dates from a time in the history of the
United States when builders, architects, and architectural
clients were eager to define and influence the character of
our infant nation. By choosing to design and build structures
after the fashion of admired cultures and esteemed periods of
history, such as that of ancient Greece, ancient Rome or the
Gothic period, Americans asserted the supremacy of the ideals
of several different cultures in the hope that, in so doing,
they would influence the culture of their fellow countrymen
and countrywomen. This approach to architectural design passed
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largely out of fashion following the First World War. The
presence of buildings designed in the era preceding the Great
War insures that the ambitious and infectious idealism of the
young Nation, which helped to spur the United States into a
position of world supremacy, will continue to influence
thinking about design, craftsmanship and culture as a whole.
The power of historic architecture in this regard is
widely-recognized, as is demonstrated by a quotation of John
Costonis from his scholarly work. Law and Aesthetics :
"environmental resources. . .enter into the
cognitive and emotional lives (of those who
experience them) and, ultimately, help shape the
identity of individuals, groups and communities."
(6)
Historic architecture's usefulness to scholarship is also
indicative of its paramount cultural value, and this presents
a strong argument for its continued preservation, as well.
Historic architecture in Center City is useful for the study
not only of architecture, architectural history and historic
preservation, but also of history, art, art history,
sociology, anthropology, planning and engineering. Thus, the
City's architectural resources provide a rich visual
environment and field of study for students enrolled in the
City's numerous institutions of higher learning.
Conclusion
"Although landmarks may have national or even
international status, their impact is greatest in
their host city. They enrich its fabric by adding
an aesthetic grace note to the lives of its
12

residents. They define its character for
non-residents. And they should figure prominently
in the city's planning and zoning regime, which, if
it is sensitive to urban design values at all will
recognize these buildings as precious civic assets."
(7)
This quotation from John Costonis's Space Adrift
demonstrates that Philadelphia's economic fortunes and its
role as a center of culture are dependent on the well being
of its historic architecture. It is as though the legacy left
to modern day Philadelphia from its halcyon days as an
industrial and financial powerhouse illuminates the path to
the City's revitalization, and a TDR plan, by furthering the
revitalization of Center City, can have a significant and
beneficial effect on the future of Philadelphia.
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THE TRADITIONAL DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING
LANDMARK PRESERVATION PROGRAMS UNDERSCORE THE ADVANTAGES OF
TDR IMPLEMENTATION
The traditional difficulties associated with implementing
landmark preservation programs are economic, political, and
administrative in nature. All of these difficulties arise
from the fact that, on the one hand, historic preservation is
an inherently expensive undertaking and that, on the other
hand, it infrequently produces a short-term, financial benefit
that dwarfs the initial investment. For this reason, it is not
usually an attractive investment proposition. Since members
of the private sector cannot financially justify investments
in historic preservation, the government has been given the
role of safeguarding the nation's landmarks.
For several reasons, however, placing this burden on the
government is hardly a solution to the preservation dilemma.
First, the government is limited as to the controls it can
impose upon private property. Thus, it cannot decree
preservation. Second, it is economically unfeasible for the
government to acquire landmark buildings on a large scale in
order to insure their preservation. The high cost of landmark
acquisition is attributable in many cases to landmarks being
located in downtown areas, where land prices have escalated
sharply in recent years. Landmark acquisition by government
also has negative economic consequences that extend beyond
initial acquisition costs, as additional expenditures are
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needed for maintenance, and government acquisition of
landmarks would result in their removal from the tax rolls,
which would be deleterious to the budgets of older,
financially-troubled cities. Government acquisition programs,
therefore, are unsound economic propositions. This may be for
the best, however, for the failure of the City of
Philadelphia, because of its budget difficulties, to protect
the landmarks that it does own from fire and vandalism
demonstrates that government ownership can sometimes be the
worst fate for a landmark.
Cognizant of the economic unfeasibility of government
landmark acquisition, municipalities have attempted to impose
the economic burden of preservation on private property
owners. As a result, municipal designation programs have met
with stiff political opposition. On a general level, landmark
preservation through municipal designation generates political
opposition because it violates the nation's laissez-faire
sensibilities. On a more concrete level, it threatens the
profitability of urban real estate investments, undermining
the objectives of some the most powerful lobbies within the
mtmicipal political arena, namely real estate developers, real
estate brokers, and financial institutions. Because municipal
designation can reduce the profitability of investments, it
furi:hermore risks raising charges that it constitutes a taking
of private property without due compensation in violation of
the nation's Constitution. Even when municipalities succeed
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in enacting preservation ordinances designed to survive
Constitutional challenge and to restrict landmark demolition
and alteration, the political battles that rage as a result
of historic designation and enforcement continue nonetheless
and often cause the city to relax enforcement. The result is
that municipal designation programs often fall short of their
goals.
Even if there were no political opposition to landmark
designation, the administrative problems of historic
preservation agencies would still exist. Government landmark
preservation offices are often inadeguately staffed to perform
their objectives. For example, the number of endangered and
potentially-endangered landmarks in Philadelphia, which is in
the thousands, is daunting when compared to the staffing level
at the Philadelphia Historical Commission, which numbers fewer
than ten.
The above-mentioned economic and political dilemmas
seemed to have been overcome during the early 1980 's when the
federal government provided a tax credit and other incentives,
both of which are described more fully in subsequent chapters,
to encourage the renovation of commercial and industrial,
income-producing buildings listed on the National Register of
Historic Places. Programs dependent on this provision in the
Federal tax law suffered under the 1986 Tax Reform Act which
reduced these credits, and renovation of historic landmarks
has declined precipitously since. Thus, the traditional
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shortcoming of existing preservation programs not providing
an incentive to renovate and maintain landmark buildings has
returned
.
Therefore, since landmark preservation programs do not
enhance the profitability of real estate investments, unless
programs are accompanied by incentives , and since they are
politically difficult and costly to implement and enforce, and
since acquisition of landmarks is prohibitively expensive,
landmark preservation has traditionally been a difficult
undertaking.
A TDR plan remedies these traditional difficulties. A TDR
plan combines the benefit of erstwhile Federal incentive
programs and code enforcement, without the uncertainty of
Federal tax credits or the perpetual, day-to-day
responsibility associated with municipal ownership.
Whereas the value of Federal tax credits changed
frequently due to acts of Congress, the value of development
rights fluctuates with the demand for commercial, high-rise
real estate ; i.e., the per square foot price of TDRs is tied
to the per square foot rental price of high-rise office space.
Thus, when the financial motivation to demolish buildings is
greatest, the dollar value of the development rights will be
at its highest level.
Whereas, Federal tax incentives and the City's code
enforcement program were run at the taxpayer's expense, a TDR
plan could be administered by the privately-financed
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Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation, as they
already enforce facade easement covenants. This would save the
City time and money. And part of the proceeds of the sale of
development rights could be set aside by PHPC to provide for
the long-term maintenance of property, something which
existing programs do not provide.
In these ways, the traditional difficulties associated
with landmark preservation programs highlight the advantages
of TDR implementation. TDRs offer the municipality control
without ownership, no diminution of the tax base, they make
designation more palatable to property owners, they need not
be administered by the city, they are long-term in impact and
not subject to the vagaries and fluctuations of the Federal
tax code.
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ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF LANDMARK PRESERVATION IN CENTER CITY
PHILADELPHIA: AN OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
It is demonstrated in the previous sections of this
chapter both that historic preservation presents several
benefits to Center City Philadelphia and that there are
numerous difficulties associated with implementing and
maintaining municipal landmark preservation programs in light
of challenging financial, political and administrative
constraints. Subsequent chapters in this thesis explain why
TOR implementation constitutes an appropriate solution to the
City's preservation dilemma.
The chapter immediately following (Chapter Two)
demonstrates that the factors contributing to the demolition
of historic buildings in Center City, both those which can be
attributed to actions of local and federal government agencies
and those which can be attributed to the actions of the
private real estate market, can be utilized by a TDR program
and transformed into forces that save historic buildings. The
same chapter then itemizes, vis-a-vis these causes of
demolition, the shortcomings of existing historic preservation
progrsuns and describes how TDRs can reinforce the weakened web
of existing preservation programs.
The subsequent chapter (Chapter Three) introduces the TDR
concept, presents its history and its theoretical benefits
and exeimines its use in other cities' historic preservation
initiatives. Its use in these cities reveals the numerous
19

legal, financial, planning and cultural issues involved in
implementing a TDR plan and demonstrates that a TDR will not
work if attention is not paid to all of the above-mentioned
factors
.
Chapter Four discusses the United States Supreme Court's
recent stances on the Taking, Due Process and Equal Protection
issues so as to determine whether or not a TDR program in
Philadelphia would survive a Constitutional challenge. Also
considered in this chapter are the anti-trust liability of the
City, and the significance of recently enacted Pennsylvania
Statutes for TDR implementation. Planning issues related to
TDR implementation are also considered in this section.
By reviewing where development rights transfers have
already occurred in Center City Philadelphia, Chapter Five
suggests locations within Center City that would be most
suitable as sending and receiving sites. This same Chapter
presents a proposed TDR Program for Philadelphia, describing
Program design emd administration. Chapter 6 presents the
findings and conclusion of this study.
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CHAPTER TWO; Tfil DEMOLITION PRQI^T.KM IN CENTER CITY
PHILADELPHIA
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Although a number of preservation programs and
preservation organizations currently exist in Center City
Philadelphia, the demolition problem still threatens the
City's historic architectural heritage. To determine why
these threats persist, this chapter examines the types and
causes of demolition threats and then examines existing
preservation programs and their shortcomings. By focusing on
these issues, this chapter demonstrates that there is a
"window of opportunity" for TDRs to complement existing
programs in the longstanding effort to eliminate the
demolition threat to historic architecture.
An Overview of Demolition Activity in Center City
The Historical Commission is currently reviewing three
demolition permit applications involving seven City-certified
structures. One is for 26-30 South 21st Street. The owners of
these three nineteenth-century rowhouses propose to erect a
high-rise office building on this site. The second is for 1908
Chestnut Street, formerly known as the Boyd Theatre. The owner
proposes to replace the existing theatre with a modern theatre
of approximately the same size. (8) This proposal has brought
the owner in conflict with the Philadelphia Historical
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Commission, and this conflict has escalated into a court
battle, currently before the Commonwealth Supreme Court, a
case known as United Artists Theater Circuit. Inc. v. City of
Philadelphia . The third is for a group of three historically-
certified, nineteenth century rowhouses at the southeast
corner of Ninth and Chestnut Streets. The owners propose
demolishing the rear of these buildings and selling a new
high-rise building on that site to nearby Thomas Jefferson
Medical School. (9)
The outcome of these cases is uncertain, and the record
of the Commission and other preservation groups in preventing
demolition is mixed. In several cases, the Historical
Commission, along with other preservation organizations and
citizens groups, have put enough pressure on developers and
property owners to prevent a number of demolition proposals.
Examples of such cases are Lit Brothers Department Store at
Eighth and Market Streets, which has been renovated and become
Mellon Independence Center, a mixed-use, office/retail
complex; Holy Trinity Church at Rittenhouse Square and Walnut
Street, which was almost demolished to make way for a
residential high-rise building; the buildings at the northeast
corner of 17th and Locust Streets, also threatened by high-
rise development; and the Swedenborgian Church at 22nd and
Chestnut Streets, which has recently been renovated into
offices.
However, there are also numerous examples of cases where
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the Historical Commission and allied groups were unable to
secure landmark preservation when demolition was proposed.
Examples are the Gimbels Department Store building at Eighth
and Market Streets, now the site of a grade-level parking lot
and the proposed site of a high-rise office building; the
McCrae Houses, a series of pre-revolutionary residences on the
one hundred block of Sansom Street which were demolished to
make way for a grade-level parking lot; the Finneas Meade
Antigue Store, formerly a nineteenth-century school house at
11th and Pine Streets which has been replaced by a modern
commercial, office building; the Victory Building at Tenth and
Chestnut Streets, which has been abandoned for at least a
decade and faces almost certain demolition; and the north side
of the 1600 block of Chestnut Street, whose low-density, late-
nineteenth century, historic buildings have been replaced by
Liberty Place, a speculative, high-rise office, hotel, and
retail complex. (10)
Thus, not only is it clear that demolition threats are
alive and well in Center City, it is apparent from the
multifaceted nature of these demolition threats that they are
generated by several factors which are not currently kept in
check
.
Econonic and Govemnental Factors Generate Demolition Pressure
The demolition problem in Center City Philadelphia arises
because the factors generating pressure for demolition are not
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balanced adequately by existing preservation programs. These
factors may be broadly categorized as those arising from
market forces on the one hand and those arising from
government regulation of land use on the other.
The primary market force encouraging demolition is the
disparity in profitability between high-income land uses, such
as high-rise office space, parking facilities, retail stores,
etc
.
, and that of property uses that can be accommodated by
historic buildings. Because the potential profit from the
former is greater than that obtained from acguiring historic
buildings and having them renovated or stabilized, urban
commercial real estate speculation and development often
entails the demolition of older, less remunerative buildings.
(11)
This disparity in profitability is illustrated by
comparing the projected return on investment offered by a
stabilized or renovated historic building and that of a new,
larger or similar-sized building on the same piece of land.
(The rate of return on investment is the quotient whose
numerator is the property's net annual income (income after
vacancy and operating expenses have been taken into account)
and whose denominator is the s\im of the price of the building
plus the cost of bringing it into working order. In other
words , ROI = net income/investment
.
)
For example, an investor purchases three contiguous 20 'x
80' parcels with three contiguous, three-story, row houses
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massed together on the land. The land is zoned C-4
commercial, and the buildings occupy 80% of the 4800 square
foot lot for a total gross floor area of 11,520, representing
an FAR of 2.4, a low-density use, when one considers that the
C-4 zone allows FARs of 5 without bonuses and 12 with. (12)
Since older structures have less-efficient floor plans
than modern buildings and since these rowhouses were built as
residences, we will assume that only 75% of the aggregate
built area can be rented as office space, as the remainder
will consist of party walls, stairs, hallways, entrance
overhangs, vestibules, etc. The net rentable area is,
therefore, 8640 square feet.
Let us assume that the investor purchases all of these
buildings together for $600,000 and incurs an additional
$576,000 in renovation expenses, assuming renovation costs of
$50 per square foot, a conservative estimate. His total
investment in the property is now $1,176,000.
His intended use for the property is office space, and
the current market rate for upgraded historic space in that
area of the city is $12 per square foot. The per square foot
rent multiplied by the net rentable area of 8,640 square feet
is $103,680, which is the gross annual income. The investor
then factors in occupany at 86.3% (per a 1988 Jackson-Cross
survey of Center City vacancy rates) (13) and a loss of 59%
of the resultant figure to expenses for annual net income of
$36,685.09. (The equation is $103,680 x .863 x .41 =
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$36,685.09). Since ROI = net annual income/investment, the
projected pre-tax ROI for this project in the first year of
operation would be about 3.1%.
Under the existing C-4 zoning for this property, the same
investor can substantially increase his rate of return to 6.6
per cent if he demolishes the historic building and maximizes
the site's zoning potential, an FAR of 5. For if he demolishes
the 11,520 square foot building for $10 per square foot, or
$115,200, and builds a new, five-story structure for $100 per
square foot, he will incur the following expenses:
acquisition $600,000
demolition $115,200
new construction $2 , 400 , 000
TOTAL COST $3,115,200
Because the new building will have a more efficient floor
plan than the old structure, the developer can expect to
utilize 80% of his gross floor area for a net rentable area
of 19,200 square feet, which he can rent for $25 per square
foot, according to the 1988 Jackson-Cross survey cited
earlier. This will generate $480,000 in gross annual income.
The developer will then factor in 86.3% occupancy and 50% loss
of the product of gross income times vacancy to establish a
net rentable income of $207,120 annually before taxes. (The
50% loss of income represents the operating costs associated
with managing an office building, which is noticeably lower
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than that for historic buildings) This represents a pre-tax
ROI of 6.6%. (Neither of these scenarios takes into account
the effect of annual inflation on ROIs, which in the case of
the new office building might raise the ROI several percentage
points, depending on the inflation rate.)
Thus, from a purely economic standpoint, newer commercial
buildings are superior to historic buildings, and the example
above illustrates the key components of this superiority.
These components are: 1) the maintenance of older buildings
is costlier than that of newer buildings; 2) the net rentable
area of landmark buildings is generally less than that of
modern structures; 3) and the per square foot rent in historic
buildings is usually lower in historic buildings than it is
in modern structures. One significant advantage not mentioned
above which new buildings have over historic buildings is that
the depreciation cast off by new buildings far exceeds that
cast off by historic buildings, as the investment in the new
construction is greater than that of the renovated historic
building. (14) This has great significance for wealthy real
estate investors, because if annual depreciation is greater
than net income, the excess depreciation can be used to
shelter income the owner may receive from other "active" real
estate investments.
These factors together conspire to make the return on
investment on historic buildings lower than that of newer
structures
.
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However, it is when these market forces are intermeshed
with government regulation of land use, in the form of zoning
designations and zoning incentives, that the threat to
historic architecture is most potent. Zoning designations that
permit tall buildings in Center City's commercial districts,
together with incentives in the zoning code that promote high-
rise development, inadvertently encourage the demolition of
low-density (often historic) buildings.
For instance, the C-4 and C-5 commercial zoning districts
place approximately 15 million square feet of developable
floor area in the zoning envelopes above city-certified
historic buildings in Center City, thereby creating both the
opportunity and the incentive for the demolition of hundreds
of structures, as the ROI scenario above demonstrates. (15)
The zoning code of Philadelphia makes high-density
development feasible and attractive to property owners in
other ways, too. According to a 1985 Philadelphia City
Planning Commission study of Center City zoning, the current
bonus program encourages the construction of high-rise
buildings along wide streets by granting additional floor area
at a rate of 5% of the lot area for each additional foot of
street width for every street over sixty in width. Because of
this, a developer could conceivably build 100% more gross
floor area than that normally allowed by zoning if the street
is 80' wide or greater.
The advantage of this code provision from a planning
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standpoint is quite apparent:
"The authors of the current code wrote the code
to encourage the placement of tall buildings along
the widest streets, as this maximizes the amount of
light and air available to building occupants and
as these streets handle the increased traffic better
than narrow streets." (16)
However, the disadvantage is that, because the widest
streets abut both low-density districts and high-density
districts, the zoning code provision encourages high-density
development to impinge upon traditionally low-density areas.
An example where such an outcome occurred is when the Liberty
Place development displaced the low-density buildings along
the entire north side of the 1600 block of Chestnut Street.
(17)
This incentive program will, therefore, continue to
result in the demolition of low-density, historic buildings
along the fringe of the high-rise corridor. (18)
Another way in which the Philadelphia Zoning Code
encourages the demolition of historic buildings is that it
requires developers, who wish to build high-rise buildings,
to acquire several small parcels and to demolish diminutive
structures on these parcel. In the C-5 and C-4 zoning
districts, properties are assigned floor-area limits, which
determine the buildable square footage for each parcel.
Developers may exceed floor-area limits by including within
their project plazas, arcades and open spaces. This has the
effect of forcing the developer to acquire more land than he
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actually needs to build a high-rise structure. (19)
Thus,
"The introduction of the zoning bonus system
has brought development on small lots to a
standstill and hastened the amalgamation of smaller
holdings into land assemblies of [40,000 sf]
sufficient size usually a quarter block or more-
—to exploit the bonuses." (20)
Since Philadelphia lots were originally subdivided from
twelve to twenty feet in width and from forty to eighty feet
in depth, developers have had to acquire numerous small
parcels, which contain small historic buildings, to amass
enough land to take advantage of the floor-area bonuses in the
code. The Commerce Square development at 22nd and Market
Streets and One Liberty Place at 17th and Market Streets are
only two examples in an office core which provides several
others
.
Thus, both market forces and government regulation of
land are responsible for the demolition problem in Center
City.
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CURRENT PROGRAMS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Existing preservation programs in Philadelphia do not
fully counter the forces bringing about demolition. The
existing preservation programs are the Philadelphia Historical
Commission's power to review all alteration and demolition
permit applications and to block proposed demolitions of City
certified buildings; the federal government's Investment Tax
Credit for the qualified rehabilitation of national register
properties; the Philadelphia Historic Preservation
Corporation's facade easement program; the low-density
residential zoning that prevails in most of Center City; and
height controls along several Center City streets.
These programs and codes have been effective in
preserving a great number of Philadelphia landmarks, but the
efficacy of some of them has diminished in recent years and,
in other cases, has always been in question.
The Philadelphia Historical Commission's Preservation
Ordinance
The Philadelphia Historical Commission was created in
1955 to further the preservation of historic landmarks and was
the first such commission in the United States to have
city-wide jurisdiction. Although a powerful preservation
agency since its founding, its powers were greatly expanded
on April 1, 1985 when the Mayor and City Council enacted into
law an amendment to the Philadelphia Code, known as Section
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14-2007, which empowers the Historical Commission to designate
individual buildings and districts of buildings that possess
historic and/or architectural significance. (21)
Section 14-2007 of the Philadelphia Code provides that
when a permit application is filed with the Department of
Licenses and Inspections to alter or demolish an
historically-certified building, structure, site or object or
a buildings, structure, site or object within an historic
district, the Department of Licenses and Inspections (L & I)
will forward the application to the Historical Commission for
review. Before L & I may issue a permit to alter or demolish
the historic building or to construct, alter or demolish a
buildings within an historic district, the applicant must
submit plans and specifications for the proposed work to the
Historical Commission.
In cases where the owner wishes to demolish the building,
and claims that the building cannot "be used for any purpose
for which it is or may be reasonably adapted," or where a
permit application for an alteration is based, "in whole or
in part," on financial hardship, the owner must submit
financial data to the Historical Commission such as property
acquisition costs, the assessed value of the land and
improvements, the property's cash flow, operating expenses,
taxes, debt service, etc., and the Historical Commission may
require the owner to conduct a study to determine whether or
not the building "has or may have alternate uses consistent
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with preservation." (22)
Within sixty days after receipt by the Historical
Commission of the permit application, the Commission must
determine whether or not it has any objections to the proposed
alteration or demolition. If the Commission has no objection,
L & I grants a permit. If the Commission has an objection,
L & I denies the application for the permit. The Historical
Commission may also postpone its decision for a period of up
to six months.
The Historical Commission can direct L & I to issue a
permit if it deems the proposed activity to be necessary to
the public interest or if the Commission finds that the
building "cannot be used for any purpose for which it is or
may be reasonably adapted," based on the owner's presentation
of an argument that the
"sale of the property is impracticable, that
commercial rental cannot provide a reasonable rate
of return and that other potential uses of the
property are foreclosed." (23)
L & I may also not issue permits for demolition or
alterations of or construction within any individual building,
structure or site which is being considered for designation
or any building structure or site within a proposed historic
district without the consent of the Philadelphia Historical
Commission.
Although the powers granted to the Commission seem
comprehensive. Section 14-2007 has not been effective in
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preventing demolition in several cases. The demerits of the
Philadelphia Historical Commission's powers granted in Section
14-2007 are illustrated in the following case.
The Loomis Peanut Butter factory, a red-brick,
19th-century, multi-story building on Delaware Avenue just
south of the Benjamin Franklin Bridge, was demolished under
the terms of this appeal process when its owners demonstrated
to the Commission that it would have been uneconomical to
restore the property. Once the site of a distinctive,
historic building that was significant in commemorating the
industrial development of Philadelphia's Delaware River
waterfront, the site of the former factory is now occupied by
a Comfort Inn, a national, budget hotel chain which built its
standard, prefabricated building on the site, one whose
height, materials and color do not conform with the existing
urban fabric.
A second case where Section 14-2007 did not prevent
demolition demonstrates that not only can demolition be
accomplished through the appeal process, but also that the
Historical Commission will permit designated buildings, or
buildings under consideration for designation, to be
demolished if they perceive that not allowing demolition
would meet with stiff political opposition. A case in point
is that of the Bulletin Building, a turn-of-the-century,
terra-cotta. Beaux Arts building that until 1985 graced the
northeast corner of Juniper and Filbert Streets, opposite City
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Hall. The site, under consideration for designation, was
acquired by the City for the construction of the Criminal
Justice Center- Since the City of Philadelphia, itself,
wanted to demolish the building, the Historical Commission
felt compelled to grant the permit application, especially
since its power to stay demolitions was only recently granted
by City Council.
These cases demonstrate that although the Historical
Commission has the right to delay the demolition of designated
buildings, political and economic realities override this
privilege, and the consequence is that historic buildings
continue to be demolished.
An added shortcoming to the Historical Commission's power
is that it is understaffed to carry out the task of
designating and monitoring all of the endangered historic
buildings in this city. Finally, the power of the Historical
Commission to block demolitions of designated buildings is not
completely effective because, although it can preserve
endangered buildings from the demolition threats at the time
of the proposed demolition, it in no way remedies the
conditions that prompted the owners to submit the demolition
application in the first place; i. e., the law presents an
obstacle to the property owner's proposed exploitation of the
property but does not present an incentive to the property
owner to preserve or renovate the building, and therein lies
one of the most significant shortcomings of this current
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historic preservation program.
The Investment Tax Credit for Historic Preservation
The distinction between regulations and incentive
programs drawn in the paragraph immediately preceding is
important because it was its incentive to property owners and
investors to renovate buildings that made the Investment Tax
Credit for Qualified Rehabilitations of Historic Buildings the
success that it was. In the period between 1982 and 1985, the
halcyon years of the tax credit, the Investment Tax Credit
(ITC) stimulated "an estimated $8.8 billion of investment in
more than 11,700 historic buildings" nationally. (24) Many of
the buildings renovated under the provisions of the ITC were
in downtown areas of the nation's older, industrial cities,
such as Chicago, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Cleveland and,
notably, Philadelphia.
The ITC is an example of a federal program which used
financial incentives to lure private-sector investment into
the renovation of historic buildings, thereby reversing the
previously-existing situation where the private sector was
often the nemesis of historic buildings.
The history of the ITC begins, significantly, at the
nation's Bicentennial, when the Internal Revenue Code provided
incentives to encourage private investors to transform
historic buildings into income-producing, commercial and
residential properties. The incentives were a 1) five-year
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amortization of the cost of rehabilitation; 2) 19-year,
accelerated depreciation; and 3) a 10% ITC for the
rehabilitation of buildings deemed either contributing or
significant to National Register Districts or buildings that
were listed individually on the National Register of Historic
Places. (25) Known as the Tax Reform Act of 1976, this program
also denied the right to deduct demolition costs incurred in
real estate development projects which involved the demolition
of historic buildings. The right to use accelerated
depreciation was also denied for such projects.
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1976 was further
strengthened and amended by the Revenue Act of 1977 and the
Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980, federal historic
preservation policy was completely transformed by the
Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981 (ERTA). This act, amended
by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, replaced the earlier
preservation tax incentive with a 25% ITC for "the substantial
rehabilitation of certified historic commercial, industrial
or rental residential buildings." (26) Under the provisions
of ERTA, the 25% ITC could be combined with an 18-year cost
recovery period for the adjusted basis of the historic
property. (Adjusted basis refers to the "price of the property
plus any acquisition expenses plus capital improvements less
any depreciation already taken." (27))
In order to qualify for the tax credit, the
rehabilitation had to be undertaken under the terms of the
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Secretary of the Interior's Guidelines , which prescribed the
manner in which the building was to be renovated and the
manner in which the existing building, the proposed
alteration, and the finished product were to be documented.
The application for tax credits had to be submitted to and
approved by both the State Historic Preservation Officer and
the National Park Service, both of which acted on behalf of
the Secretary of the Interior in interpreting the Secretary's
Guidelines in either granting or denying the tax credits.
This review process took several months.
Under the provisions of ERTA, non-certified buildings
that were substantially renovated could also gualify for a 15%
ITC for 30-39 year-old buildings and for a 20% ITC for 40+
year-old buildings. These buildings could only be used for
industrial or commercial purposes but these lesser credits
were not available for rehabilitation of certified, historic
buildings; i.e., the standards for rehabilitating the
"non-historic" buildings were not as strict as those for
historically-certified ones.
Under the terms of ERTA, investors needed only to have
a passive interest in the project; i.e., they could claim the
credit without actually participating in its management or in
the development process. (28) Equally important was the fact
that syndicators of historic rehabilitations could raise
capital for such projects by pooling the investment dollars
of persons with incomes over $250,000, who were in need of tax
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shelters and who did not derive their primary incomes from
real estate. (29) Therefore, professional athletes,
physicians, attorneys, corporate executives and others
outside of the real estate profession could invest in
certified rehabilitations, claim a credit, and participate in
the rejuvenation of Philadelphia's decaying neighborhoods.
The importance of dove-tailing incentives for historic
preservation into mundane, mainstream American preoccupations,
such as reducing income taxes, cannot be overemphasized; the
more preservationists align their strategies with the demands
of the private marketplace, their more their cause will be
advanced
.
Because of the provisions of ERTA and the fact that
Philadelphia had an abundance of underutilized and inexpensive
National Register properties, numerous historic buildings in
Philadelphia were rehabilitated under the provisions of this
act in the years between 1981 and 1986. The relatively low
cost of real estate in Philadelphia when compared to that of
other major cities is important, as the 25% ITC applied only
to the costs of rehabilitation and not to the costs of
acquiring the building. Therefore, cities, such as
Philadelphia, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Baltimore and Cleveland,
with notoriously undynamic real estate markets and sizeable
inventories of underutilized commercial and industrial
buildings, were ideal cities for ITC renovations. In contrast,
cities such as San Francisco, New York and Boston, because of
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the high cost of property acquisition, were not cities where
the ITC alone could justify the purchase and renovation of
older structures. (30) As a result, Philadelphia ranked first
nationally for dollars invested for the period of 1982-84 with
$400,400,000 invested in the rehabilitation of historic
buildings and fourth nationally for the number of buildings
renovated, which was 166 for that period. (31)
In addition, a June 1988 report by the National Trust for
Historic Preservation estimates that Philadelphia benefitted
from ERTA because 2,070 housing units were renovated, $413
million in new earnings were generated, at least 17,870 jobs
were created and the gross output from sales and general
business increased $1.39 billion. (32)
Examples of Philadelphia landmark buildings that were
renovated under the provisions of ERTA, or where ERTA acted
as an incentive in the renovation of a Philadelphia landmark,
are Lit Brothers Department Store at Seventh and Market
Streets, the Curtis Building on Independence Square, the
Reading Terminal Headhouse at 12th and Market Streets, the
Packard Motor Car Company on North Broad Street, the former
Wills Eye Hospital at 16th and Spring Garden Streets, numerous
underutilized industrial "loft" buildings in Olde City and
many other Center City landmarks. This resulted in the
virtual transformation of certain areas such as Olde City and
Spring Garden from dilapidated neighborhoods into attractive,
upscale residential and commercial areas. It also resulted
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in the displacement of small, light-industrial businesses from
Olde City and of low-income residents from Center City and
Spring Garden, and this paradox of contrasting benefits and
disadvantages must be taken into account when assessing the
ITC as a preservation technigue; it was a tax credit for the
affluent which resulted in the displacement of many low-income
families from their homes.
In April 1986, however, the ERTA of 1981 was drastically
altered. The three-tiered credit (25% for certified, historic
rehabilitations, 20% for 40+ year-old buildings and 15% for
30+ year-old buildings) was replaced with a two-tier credit
for qualified expenditures, a 20% ITC for certified, historic
buildings and 10% for non-residential buildings that were
originally placed in service before 1936. (33) In addition,
the depreciation schedule was changed from "accelerated" over
19 years to "straight-line" over 31.5 years for
non-residential real property and 27.5 years for residential
real properties.
Furthermore, the 1986 Tax Reform Act provides that
"rehabilitation expenditures will not qualify
for the credit unless at least 75% of the existing
external walls are retained (including at least 50%
as external walls), and at least 75% of the
building's internal framework is retained." (34)
Under prior the prior law, a building could be completely
gutted as long as 75% of the external walls were retained.
(35) Additionally, a "passive-loss provision" in the 1986 Act
reversed the provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 that
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allowed the use of passive credits and losses to offset all
income. ("Passive" income is that which one receives from
businesses "in which a taxpayer does not materially
participate."). (36)
The 1986 Act stipulates that the ITC can only be taken
against income generated by "passive" investments, thus
severely restricting the "pool" of investors that can
participate in ITC projects to those with substantial
"passive" interests in real estate. Not only was the type of
income (active income) excluded from being offset, but other
provisions of the act related to the passive-income provision
had the effect that
"syndicators will now be offering lower vale
shares, $25,000 and less, to a larger group of
investors with gross annual incomes (less than)
$250,000 instead of the high share value, $50,000
and greater, to a limited group of high-income
investors." (37)
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected historic preservation
syndications through more subtle changes, as well. Besides
reducing the ITC, abolishing accelerated depreciation, and
altering the passive loss provision, the 1986 Tax Reform Act
eliminated preferential tax treatment for capital gains.
Capital gains refers to profits derived from the sale of
assets (i. e., capital assets) that do not generate ordinary
income. For example, whereas a physician derives "ordinary"
income practicing medicine, a physician's share in an historic
preservation syndication is an example of a capital asset.
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Capital gains taxes are only paid when such assets are sold
for a profit. Previous to 1986, capital gains were taxed at
60 per cent of their value. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
increased the rate of taxation on capital gains to 100%.
Thus, since capital gains and ordinary income are now taxed
at equal rates by the Internal Revenue Service, the 1986 Tax
Reform Act eliminated one of the many tax benefits of
investing in historic preservation syndications and
contributed to the decline of such syndications.
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced marginal tax
rates. Marginal tax rates determine the percentage of one's
income that is subject to taxation by the Internal Revenue
Service. The effect of reducing marginal tax rates was to
diminish the necessity investors felt to protect their income
by participating in such tax shelters as investments in
historic preservation syndications. (38)
Thus, the Tax Refoirm Act of 1986 had the overall effect
of making a project's return on investment and risk the
predominant factors in making real estate decisions.
Furtheirmore , all of these amendments to the tax laws
together had the effect of making it much more complicated to
acquire the money required to rehabilitate buildings, and as
a result of these changes, the rehabilitation of certified
historic buildings has declined 40% in the United states since
the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. (39) The more
important result from the standpoint of preservation is that
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the incentive to preserve historic buildings is substantially
reduced, and the incentive to demolish historic buildings is
enhanced. Therein lies the principal shortcoming of the
Investment Tax Credit for Historic Preservation.
However, there is another shortcoming of the federal
historic preservation initiative, which has much relevance to
the ITC. Although being listed on the National Register of
Historic Places qualifies buildings for tax act
rehabilitations, the fact that a building is listed on or
eligible for listing provides only limited protection. First,
it does not protect structures from private sector demolition.
Secondly, the National Register only protects listed
structures from demolition by the Federal Government or from
construction activity which is funded by the Federal
Government and undertaken by state, local or county
governments, to the extent that it requires federal agencies
to perform a thorough review (known as a "Section 106 Review")
of issues involved in demolition and of alternatives to
demolition. After such review, if the government determines
that the benefits of demolishing the historic structure
outweigh the losses, the historic structure may be demolished.
The PHPC Facade Easement Program
The third current historic preservation program affecting
historically-designated buildings in Center City Philadelphia
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is the Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation's (PHPC)
facade easement program, a program which has enjoyed great
success in recent years.
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated many of
the tax incentives for rehabilitating certified, historic
buildings, the charitable contribution deduction for the
donation of a historic preservation easement is still
available to property owners under the provisions of the 1980
Tax Treatment Extension Act, an act that clearly established
this deduction for historic preservation purposes. Under the
provisions of this act, the donor of a facade easement may
enjoy a one-time income, gift, estate or real property tax
deduction in return rehabilitating, maintaining, and promising
never to demolish.
An owner of a historic property may enjoy this deduction
when he conveys the facade of the structure to a qualified,
non-profit, or government, donee organization. The
Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation acts as the
donee organization in Philadelphia. The easement restricts
change or destruction of the facade by the donor or any future
owner of the property, and the transaction is known as a
recorded facade easement.
In order to qualify as a charitable deduction, the
easement must be donated on a facade of a property listed on
the National Register of Historic Places or certified by the
Secretary of Interior as a "contributing" or "significant"
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structure within a National Register District or within a
local historic district; the easement must be given in
perpetuity, i.e. run with the land; it must be "exclusively
for conservation purposes;" (40) and any mortgagee of the
subject property must subordinate its mortgage rights to the
enforcement rights of the donee organization. The donor of
a facade easement relinquishes the right to exploit all
development rights within the zoning envelope above his/her
historic building, but unforseen events, such as a destructive
fire or an eminent domain proceeding may extinguish the
easement.
The donor also makes a monetary donation to the donee
organization, which also qualifies as a charitable deduction.
These monies are set aside to fund the enforcement of the
easement. It is these donations that fund PHPC, the
organization which specifies the restoration and maintenance
requirements for the building, restricts modifications to the
facade of the building, and enforces the easement covenants.
The value of the charitable contribution, a subject which
pertains to the value of development rights in TDR programs,
is the "fair market value (FMV) of the perpetual conservation
restriction at the time of the contribution," (41) i.e., the
difference between the FMV of the property before and after
the encumbrance of the easement. The easement value depends
on the nature of the restriction, the nature and location of
the property, and its development potential. For a
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single-family residence, where the use is likely to remain
constant, the value of the easement is generally 7.5 per cent
or less of the fair market value of the subject property. (42)
On commercial properties, the value of the easement is
frequently about 10% of market value and open space easements
may have values of greater than 10%. (A New York Times article
on the subject states that easements are generally 3-7 per
cent of market value.) (43) A qualified appraiser, independent
of PHPC, determines the value of the donation by preparing an
appraisal
.
The income approach to value, used by appraisers in the
valuation of real estate, is considered most applicable for
determining the value of the preservation restriction for
income-producing properties since it most accurately measures
loss in income and/or increased expenses, and the sales
comparison approach to value is considered most appropriate
for determining the value of facade easement donations on
residential properties. (44)
A separate report documents the property's physical
condition and architectural detail, serving as a reference for
future easement enforcement.
The tax consequences of the donation of a facade easement
depend upon the property owner's particular tax situation in
relation to the value of the easement donated. Therefore, at
the 28 per cent income level, the deduction is worth $0.28 for
each dollar of the donated easement's value. The value of the
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easement increases as taxable income increases. (45)
There were 129 facade easement donations in Philadelphia
from 1979 to the end of 1991, 82 of which were in Center City.
(46) Furthermore, Philadelphia possesses "well over 4,000
structures on the National Register of Historic Places which
are potentially eligible for the easement program." (47) in
its peak year, 1983, PHPC received twenty-six facade
easements. Since then, there has been a steady decrease of
donations, with only three having occurred in 1988.
This diminution in use may be explained by the fact that
facade easement donations were freguently given on properties
that were undergoing certified rehabilitations, and the
declining use of the Investment Tax Credit following the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 has consequently reduced the use of the
facade easement program. (48) Other factors related to the
1986 Tax Reform have adversely affected the rate at which
easements are currently being donated to PHPC. First, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 gradually reduced marginal tax rates year
by year, resulting in less demand for tax shelters. Also,
easements can bring down taxable income so much that property
owners have to spread the deduction over several years, which
is thought to complicate the donation from the investor's
standpoint. Thirdly, changing tax laws deter investors from
using programs, such as PHPC's, because changes in the laws
create uncertainty as to the easement's value. (49)
Thus,
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"The uncertainty of easement value and
[furthermore], until 1986, the lack of clear IRS
regulation, has kept many investors away from the
program." (50)
Furthermore
,
"all owners of eligible properties may not find the
tax benefits sufficient to offset the perpetual
economic burdens imposed by a facade easement." (51)
A related problem with facade easement donations is their
regulation. Although PHPC vigorously regulates the condition
of donated facades, it is unlikely, given that the overhead
costs incurred by staffing PHPC, that this monitoring can
continue indefinitely. (52)
Therefore, although the PHPC facade easement program has
ensured the preservation of many of Center City historic
buildings, it is an incentive that is vulnerable to changes
in the ever-fluctuating tax code. Therein lies the shortcoming
of the PHPC facade easement program.
Zoning and Height Controls
The remaining drawbacks of existing programs and codes
have mostly to do with zoning and height controls.
Although, zoning and height controls do safeguard many
historic buildings from high-rise encroachment, zoning may
create an incentive for high-rise development to encroach upon
traditionally low-density areas. Whereas zoning is
restrictive, its height controls have the limitation that they
may be appealed, and developers will spare no expense in
49

attempting to obtain zoning variances for high-density
development or any other land use where it is not normally
permitted if the potential gain warrants the attempt.
Furthermore, downzoning historic buildings that are currently
zoned for high-density uses would be very unpopular with
property owners and might make the city vulnerable to legal
action. Finally, "spot" zoning, which would zone historically-
significant buildings in high-rise commercial zones for low-
density uses, is illegal.
Thus, because existing codes and programs do not balance
market forces and government regulations, the demolition
problem persists.
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CONCLUSION: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS UNDERSCORE
BENEFITS OF TDR IMPLEMENTATION
Existing programs do not and can not be expected to
address all preservation dilenunas of the present day. These
programs do to some extent counteract the presence of the
demolition problem, but this chapter has demonstrated that a
"gap" exists within this framework, leaving certain aspects
of the demolition problem unaddressed.
The Transfer of Development Rights is the ideal program
to complement existing preservation programs for several
reasons. First, it will safeguard designated buildings in
perpetuity from demolition. Second, it presents an economic
incentive to owners of designated buildings. Third, it will
provide funding for the long-term maintenance of designated
buildings. Fourth, its implementation can be undertaken by
existing preservation organizations. Finally, TDRs would not
be vulnerable to the changing of tax laws.
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CHAPTER THREE; THE CONCEPT OF THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS AND ITS CURRENT APPLICATION IN URBAN HISTORIC
PRESERVATION INITIATIVES
INTRODUCTION TO TDRs
Transfer of Development Rights programs are currently
implemented in a small number of communities in the United
States as a means of protecting a variety of resources,
including agricultural soils, wilderness, open space and, as
is proposed herein, historic architecture. Whether designed
to protect the natural or the built environment, different TDR
programs are always alike in that they involve the transfer
of unutilized development potential from one property (the
"sending site"), which retains its original density, to
another property (the "receiving site"), where development is
allowed to occur to an extent that exceeds limits normally
prescribed by zoning.
Urbzm Historic Preservation Prograns
In TDR programs designed to preserve urban, historic
architecture, the development potential permitted by zoning
above historic structures is transferred to receiving sites
where high-rise development is proposed. The amount of
development potential that may be transferred to a receiving
site is computed first by determining the size of the sending
site's "zoning envelope." The zoning envelope is the maximum
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permitted gross floor area; it is computed by multiplying the
area of the property by the floor-area ratio (FAR), which is
prescribed by the zoning ordinance. In Philadelphia, for
example, the C-4 and C-5 commercial zones have base FARs of
5 and 12, respectively. Thus, zoning envelopes may contain
hundreds of thousands of square feet of gross floor area if
the lot size is large enough.
Once the amount of gross floor area permitted in the
zoning envelope is determined, the gross floor area of the
sending site's existing historic structure is subtracted from
this figure, yielding the development potential which may be
transferred.
The purchaser of the development rights, i.e., the owner
of the receiving site, then computes the as-of-right FAR
permitted on his property and to that figure adds the gross
floor area to be severed from the sending site. This
determines the total gross floor area which he may now
construct on the receiving site. Municipalities usually limit
the number of development rights that may be transferred to
any given site, thereby limiting the overall development
potential of the receiving site. Once the transfer of gross
floor area has occurred in a historic TDR program, a
restrictive covenant is publicly recorded, prohibiting any
future use of the transferred development potential on the
sending site. This restriction runs with the land.
With respect to the above-mentioned aspects of the TDR
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process, urban, historic TDR programs do not differ much from
one another. However, they may differ in several other
respects. For instance, TDR programs differ with respect to
the number of administrative bodies that must approve the
transfer. In some cities, the transfer process involves
planning, historical and other commissions, and in other
cities, only the planning commission is involved. Second, TDR
programs may be either mandatory, thereby restricting
development on all potential sending sites, or they may be
voluntary, allowing the marketplace to first match a buyer and
seller of the development rights before burdening the sending
site with a land-use restriction. Third, in some programs,
development rights "banks" are established to insure that
sellers can always sell their remaining development potential
and that purchasers can always buy additional gross floor
area. TDR banks have the added advantage of lessening the
likelihood of legal action being taken against TDR programs,
as they insure that designated properties will be able to sell
their development rights at a fairly constant value. Other
programs do not have banks at all. Fourth, certain TDR
programs only allow transfers of gross floor area to adjacent
sites, whereas others only permit transfers between non-
adjacent sites. Lastly, programs differ in terms of how
historic buildings are selected for involvement within a TDR
program. Some programs involve all locally designated
buildings, both those that exist within local historic
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districts and those that are individually-certified. Other
programs only involve individually-certified, locally-
designated buildings.
The Theoretical Premises for and Benefits of TDR
Implenentation
The theoretical premise upon which TDR plans are
implemented is that they will actualize several major urban
planning objectives. Foremost among them are that they will:
1) decrease the likelihood of high-rise development displacing
low-density historic buildings in and along the periphery of
the urban office core; and 2) provide for the long-term
maintenance of historic buildings. In theory, TDR programs not
only accomplish these goals, but also pass the cost of
landmark preservation on to well-financed high-rise developers
in a way that will be lucrative for developers; developers
will pay owners of historic buildings for their development
rights because they will enable them to build larger, and
hence more lucrative, structures. Likewise, owners of historic
buildings will be motivated to sell their development rights
because they will, in so doing, receive partial financial
compensation for landmark designation.
Other theoretical benefits of the transfer of development
rights from historic buildings to high-rise development sites
are that they not only reduce the burden of landmark
designation by offering financial compensation, but also, the
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money gained from the sale of development rights can be
managed so as to provide for the continued maintenance of the
historic building, which, as the previous chapter
demonstrates, will have higher maintenance costs and lower
rental rates than newer buildings. TDR programs, thus, make
the prospect of maintaining an historic building competitive
with that of demolishing it and replacing it with new
construction. In addition, the transfer of development rights
from historic buildings may lower the taxes on designated
historic buildings, thereby further increasing their positive
cash flow.
Another theoretical benefit of TDRs that accrues to the
entire host city is that they balance densities throughout the
city, as historic, low-rise areas retain their character and
identity and high-rise, commercial areas continued to be
developed as such. Thus,
"TDRs differ from traditional density bonus
programs in that they do not increase a city's net
density. Transfer programs do not create new space;
they redistribute space that has already been
authorized." (53)
Finally, TDR programs not only provide the benefit of
balancing urban densities, but also the renovation and
maintenance of historic buildings would balance new
construction stylistically and historically.
The Philadelphia TDR Proposal
It is with these benefits in mind that the Philadelphia
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city Planning Commission has proposed the implementation of
a TDR plan in Center City Philadelphia. The Planning
Commission's proposal is that the transfer of development
rights from historic buildings, along with the provisions of
such civic amenities as subway entrances, fountains, plazas,
cross-block concourses, etc., should join the list of
amenities which would entitle developers to surpass base FARs
in the C-4 and C-5 commercial districts to prescribed maximum
FARs.
The Philadelphia Zoning Code currently allows developers
to exceed the base floor-area ratios in Center City's high-
rise commercial zoning districts by as much as 360 per cent
without the purchase of development rights from historic
buildings or the provision of the above-mentioned amenities.
The base FARs of 12 in the C-5 zoning district and 5 in C-4
may be increased to 20 to 22 in C-5 and 13 to 17 in C-4 for
buildings that are constructed away from streets and lot
lines, both at and above street level, and for buildings
constructed with street-level arcades.
It is to Philadelphia's advantage that several
municipalities have already enacted TDR plans, as these
existing plans have tested the TDR concept in a variety of
circumstances. Examples of cities that have implemented TDR
programs designed to protect historically-significant sites
or buildings are New York, San Francisco, and Denver. In
contrast, cities and counties which have implemented TDR
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programs in order to protect environmentally-sensitive sites
are Burlington County, New Jersey; Collier County, Florida;
Santa Monica, California; Montgomery County, Maryland; and a
handful of municipalities within Pennsylvania. Further
illustrating the creativity with which TDRs can be implemented
to influence land-use decisions is Seattle's TDR plan, which
encourages the retention and rehabilitation of low- and
moderate- income housing.
This chapter will focus on the TDR programs implemented
in American cities that are similar to that proposed by the
Philadelphia City Planning Commission and explain how existing
plans could be modified to suit the Philadelphia marketplace
and political arena. The first plan to be considered is that
of New York City.
The New York City TDR Plem
A 1968 amendment to the New York City zoning ordinance
permits transfers of development rights from
locally-designated, individually-certified landmark buildings
to adjacent lots on the same city block, to lots across the
street, or to lots diagonally across an intersection, provided
that such lots are owned by the same party. (54) The unbuilt
floor area that may be transferred is then determined first
by multiplying the floor-area ratio (FAR) by the lot area.
The floor area already occupied by the landmark is then
subtracted from this figure. Transfers may be made either to
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one or to several different adjacent lots until the authorized
floor area of the landmark lot is exhausted. When a transfer
of excess density occurs, it is permanent and runs with the
title of the land.
In 1969, the New York City Planning Commission amended
its TDR program, redefining "adjacent sites." This amendment
permits transfers of development rights from landmarks to any
lot in a chain of adjacent, common ownership, provided that
the first link in the chain is contiguous to or across the
street from the landmark property. (55)
The New York TDR plan is designed to ensure both
preservation of the sending site and responsible development
on the receiving site. To insure this, the plan has a lengthy
review procedure.
First the New York City Planning Commission must approve
the type of development that will take place, reviewing the
suitability of the materials, design, scale and location.
Then, the landmark owners and receiving site owners must apply
to the Planning Commission for preliminary review of the
proposed transfer. Following this, the parties involved must
submit site plans for the proposed development of the
adjoining lot, a report detailing the future, ongoing
maintenance of the landmark, and a report to the Landmarks
Commission describing the foreseeable effects of the proposed
transfer upon the landmark. The estimated costs of maintaining
the landmark are evaluated by the city when it reviews the
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price of development rights to be transferred, and the
Commission has the legal authority to reject the transfer if
the proposed price is insufficient to maintain the landmark.
(56)
During the review process, the Planning Commission must
determine what detrimental effects, if any, the transfer might
have on the occupants of the buildings in the vicinity of the
receiving lot, particularly in terms of overbuilding and
design compatibility. The Planning Commission must also
determine whether the proposed maintenance program for the
landmark will, in fact, result in preservation.
After the Planning Commission reviews the application,
the Board of Estimate reviews the proposed transfer. The
Board of Estimate has ultimate authority to grant or deny the
transfer. If the proposed transfer is approved, the owner of
the landmark building must donate a preservation and
conservation easement to insure compliance with the
maintenance agreement.
Whereas sending sites may transfer all of their unused
development rights, the floor area of the receiving site
cannot be more than 20% greater than the amount to which it
is entitled by zoning prior to the transfer, although "no
ceiling is set for lots in high-density commercial zones."
(57)
In addition, the Planning Commission has the power to
condition the approval of the transfer upon the developer's
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provision of an amenity. New York has further amended the TDR
plan to require that when development rights are transferred
from lots under city, state or federal ownership, amenities
that improve the pedestrian circulation or transportation
systems in the areas of the receiving site must be included
in the high-rise development. (58)
Assessments of the success of the New York Plan are
offered by several writers. Roddewig states, that
"New York City's TDR program has been among the
most active in the country, yet during the eighteen
years that the TDR mechanism has been in effect,
there have been only a dozen transfers from the
nearly 700 landmark structures in New York City."
(59)
Both Roddewig and Costonis offer explanations as to why
the New York City Plan is operating at the rate of twelve
transfers over eighteen years. Roddewig states that because
New York City allows developers to obtain additional height
through zoning lot mergers, "which is as-of-right and not
subject to a review process," and since developers can
simply attempt to increase density by applying for a height
or bulk variance, which may require only zoning and planning
board approval , they are understandably reluctant to attempt
first to utilize the TDR plan before exhausting both of these
two comparatively straight-forward and well-tested
procedures
.
( 60
)
Costonis cites certain other aspects of the New York City
Plan which, he claims, prevent its being used more frequently.
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First among these defects is "the absence of a rational
incentive structure for inducing landowners to agree to
preserve their landmarks." (61)
"By limiting development rights transfers to
adjacent lots, the program imposes severe restraints
upon the potential market for these rights.
Existing zoning in New York and other cities already
permits developers to shift unused floor area to
contiguous parcels. Hence, the plan is useful only
when a developer can be found who happens to own a
lot located across a street or an intersection from
a landmark or when a landmark owner who owns a
series of lots that connect with the landmark lot
desires to build on one or more of these lots." (62)
Secondly, the value of the development rights is
"controlled wholly by the vagaries of construction activity
within the immediate vicinity of the landmark." (63) Thus, the
development rights from any given site may command a premium
if that site adjoins the property of a projected skyscraper
but may be worthless if no construction is proposed on an
adjacent lot.
Costonis's third criticism of the New York TDR Plan is
that it does not insure that TDRs will offset the losses
sustained by the landmark owner, such as those associated with
"physical and functional obsolescence, assemblage value,
impairment of mortgageability, and feasibility of renovation."
(64)
Costonis points out, lastly, several items, namely: that
the New York Plan fails to provide supplementary funding for
those cases in which development rights do not promise full
62

compensation; that the approvals by the planning commission
must be preceded by landmark designation, which owners,
realtors and developers generally oppose; that it depends on
the voluntary participation of landmark owners; and that,
because it places new high-rise development next to historic,
low-density buildings, the results may lessen the "visual
enjoyment of the landmark." (65) Finally, the New York Plan
does not indicate what measures should be taken should there
be a rise in FAR in the landmark's zoning district subsequent
to the development rights transfer.
Despite these criticisms, the New York TDR Plan does
contain some sensible features. New York limits participation
in the development rights transfer program only to landmarks
that are individually-designated and has not extended the plan
to historic buildings within historic districts. The reason
for this is that the New York City Planning Commission feels
that extending the TDR plan to include transfers from sites
within historic districts would create an abundance of
available development rights in a market with a "very low
demand," (66) thereby possibly decreasing the value of
development rights citywide and diminishing the effectiveness
of TDRs as a preservation device.
Also, despite these criticism. New York's TDR plan has
been implemented very creatively much to the benefit of the
City. An example of the creative manner in which the New York
TDR plan has been used is the 1969 case where the Appellate
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Division Courthouse, a City-owned landmark, was adjacent to
the site of a proposed 500,000 square foot office tower, a
density 100,000 square feet in excess of the permitted FAR for
that site.
"To aid the builder, the City took advantage
of its power to lease municipally-owned buildings
for up to ninety-nine years. The developer leased
the courthouse for fifty years with a twenty-five
year renewal option; he then subleased it back to
the city, reserving the one hundred thousand square
feet he needed for his office project. Since the
developer now had a lease for seventy-five years,
he was deemed to be the owner of the courthouse lot
and could combine it with his own to produce more
floor space under the district's FAR." (67)
Another example of the creative manner in which New York
has utilized its TDR Plan is the case of South Street Seaport
in Manhattan. In this case, the City enacted a special zoning
ordinance, designating both a preservation zone, the Seaport
District, and a redevelopment zone within a historic district.
The redevelopment zone, at the time of its creation, consisted
of street-level parking lots. Excess development rights were
shifted from the preservation area to the area designated for
new development. In exchange for writing off delinquent
mortgages, a nvimber of banks received the development rights
from historic buildings, thereby enabling owners of buildings
in the Seaport District to qualify for loans to renovate their
properties. The banks held their development rights in a TDR
"bank" and sold the rights for new construction in the
redevelopment zones. As a result, the historically-renovated
area developed into a tourist attraction and several major
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office buildings were constructed in the receiving zone with
TDRs from the "bank." (68)
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York.
U.S. 104 (1978) also illustrates the manner in which New
York's TDR Plan has promoted landmark preservation. Because
the landmark designation of Grand Central Station was
accompanied by an allowance that the owners could transfer
development rights to other properties, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled against a taking in this case. (See Chapter Four)
Because of TDRs, landmark designation of commercial, high-rise
properties in New York City was made feasible and, in the eyes
of the Courts, constitutional.
Therefore, despite the drawbacks of New York's TDR Plan,
it has undoubtedly benefitted the City.
The New York TDR Plan is also extremely useful as an
example of what Philadelphia should and should not do in the
enactment of its own TDR plan. For instance, the adjacency
restriction of the New York Plan constitutes one of its
weaknesses. If the plan permitted only those transfers from
historic buildings to non-adjacent, high-rise districts, it
would obviate the need for Planning Commission review of the
effects of the new, high-rise structure on the landmark and
the landmark neighborhood, thereby simplifying the developer's
approval process and the City's involvement in the project.
The effect would be to make the prosect of participating in
a TDR program more enticing than it currently is in New York.
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The requirement that the transfer be contingent upon the
furnishing of proof that the transfer will provide enough
funds to preserve the landmark should also be incorporated
into the Philadelphia plan, as should the requirement that a
legally-binding maintenance plan be publicly recorded.
The threefold review process involving the Landmarks
Commission, the Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate
is too cumbersome. A transfer of development rights in
Philadelphia should not be as complicated as that. A transfer
could occur subject to the approval of the Zoning Board of
Adjustment, as advised by the Philadelphia City Planning
Commission and the Philadelphia Historical Commission.
Most importantly, the transfer of development rights must
only be introduced into the Center City high-rise development
process as a part of a comprehensive reform of the zoning
code, unlike what happened in New York, where existing FAR
bonus programs made TDRs superfluous from the developer's
standpoint. The purchase of development rights from an
individually-certified, historic building should be the most
attractive performance bonus available in terms of cost to the
developer and in terms of the difficulty/ease of the approval
process
.
Lastly, the provision in the New York plan that only
individually- and locally-certified landmark buildings are
eligible for density transfers should be emulated because it
would limit the supply of development rights in the Center
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city real estate market, which, because Philadelphia's real
estate market is less dynamic than Manhattan's, would keep the
value of the development rights as high as possible in order
to finance the preservation of the landmark site.
The San Francisco TDR Plan
San Francisco's TDR plan is couched in a comprehensive
height-restriction program known as the Downtown Plan of
October 1985, which is replete with legal devices designed to
stem the growth of high-rise office buildings, preserve
historic buildings, improve design restrictions on new
construction and reguire developers to provide amenities
commensurate with the size of their developments. (69)
Specifically, the Downtown Plan lowers base FAR limits,
improves height and setback limitations, and mandates the
preservation of 251 historically-significant buildings and
also of buildings that are less historically-significant but
contribute to the historic and architectural character of
downtown San Francisco. (70)
The plan permits the transfer of unused development
rights from significant and contributing buildings to
receiving lots, provided that the landmark lot abuts the
receiving lot for a distance of not less than 25 feet along
a side or rear lot line or provided that the landmark lot is
separated from the transfer lot by only a street or alley.
If both the landmark lot and the transferee lot are owned by
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the same party, bulk may be distributed within the lot as the
owner pleases. (71)
The amount of development rights that may be transferred
from a sending lot to a receiving lot is limited by the zoning
of the receiving lot. For instance, lots designated C-3-0 and
C-3-0 (SD), zoning designations whose base FAR limits are nine
and six, respectively, may not exceed an FAR of eighteen. The
gross floor area in three other commercial zones, C-3-R, C-3-
G and C-3-S, where the base FAR limits are six, six and five,
may not exceed an FAR of twelve. (72)
Since, it is only through the transfer of developments
rights from an historic building, from open space, or from the
inclusion of housing within the new building that a developer
can achieve maximum density, the incentive for developers to
use the TDR Plan in San Francisco is exceedingly strong.
The transfer of development rights from a sending lot
permanently reduces the development potential of that lot by
the amount of development rights transferred. TDR eligibility
is determined by the zoning administrator upon request by the
property owner. The zoning administrator either approves or
disapproves of the transfer, depending on the availability of
development rights on the landmark site.
Development rights from a single lot may be transferred
as a group to a single receiving lot or in separate, or even
fractional, increments to several receiving lots. Development
rights may be transferred either directly from the original
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owner to another site or to secondary purchasers who might
hold them indefinitely. (73)
In order to ensure the marketability of development
rights, the City identified receiving sites and calculated the
total number of transfers the area could handle.
The fact that only one transfer has occurred in the four
years since the plan's adoption may be attributed to the
City's almost simultaneous enactment of a three-year limit on
high-rise development which permitted only 950,000 square feet
of new high rise construction each year. A planning measure
known as Proposition M, passed in 1986, further restricted
growth to 475,000 square feet for the next 11 to 15 years.
This will depress the market for development rights even more,
and the lesson of the San Francisco Plan is, therefore, that
TDR plans are ineffectual in markets without high-rise
development and in cities that do not coordinate their
land-use policies.
Although the restrictions on high-rise development
imposed by the Downtown Plan of 1985 has stifled the demand
for transferable development rights in San Francisco, the Plan
has some noteworthy features, which a Philadelphia TDR plan
should contain.
First, although a futile action given subsequent
legislation, the introduction of TDRs was accompanied by a
revision of the entire zoning code, unlike in New York. Had
growth control measures not been passed, this would have
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placed TDRs on an equal footing with other zoning incentives.
Another noteworthy feature of the Downtown Plan is that it
allows development rights to "float" indefinitely, which means
that the renovation and perpetual maintenance of a historic
building does not have to depend upon a particular high-rise
development project's need for development rights. Therefore,
in times of weak demand for TDRs, investors may purchase
development rights from historic buildings, allowing the
preservation of architecturally-significant buildings to get
underway even at times when no new office buildings are
proposed
.
The adjacency restriction in the San Francisco plan
constitutes one its weaknesses, as this has the potential for
placing high-rise buildings next to low-density historic
buildings, thereby impairing the visual enjoyment of the
landmark site and further offsetting San Francisco's community
objective of preserving scale in historic areas.
The Denver TDR Plan
Denver adopted its historic preservation TDR plan in 1979
as a component of its more comprehensive plan to integrate the
preservation of the City's centrally-located historic fabric
with the proposed construction of a new mixed-used, commercial
development, known as the Seventeenth Street Mall. The Plan
was not, however, accompanied by either downzoning or by
historic district designation. The Plan is voluntary, and
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owner consent is sought before historic designation occurs.
The Denver Planning Commission attributes this choice on the
part of the community not to have mandatory historic
designation of properties or mandatory participation in the
TDR program to a perception that a mandatory program would
offend the sensibilities of Denverites, who prefer to keep
government regulation of private property to a minimum. (74)
The Denver TDR ordinance restricts sending sites "only
to landmark buildings individually designated by the Denver
Landmarks Commission." (75) Before a development rights
transfer can transpire, the building must be rehabilitated to
the standards of the Denver Landmarks Commission. When the
transfer does occur, the sending site's development rights are
calculated by subtracting the landmark buildings 's density
from the base FAR allowed by zoning.
The receiving site cannot increase its density to more
than 2.5:1 beyond the base zoning, and the landmark can make
no more than four transfers. Although all future development
on the sending site is permanently reduced by the number of
development rights sold, no requirement is imposed on the
owner of the historic building to ensure its long-term
maintenance. In the event that the building is destroyed by
a fire, the FAR of any successive development on the lot is
restricted to the density in force after the transfer.
In the downtown TDR area, approximately 2.7 million
square feet of unused density exists above eligible,
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designated landmarks and thirteen million square feet of
density could be made available if buildings identified by the
Denver Planning Commission as "potential landmarks" are also
counted. (76)
Because of Denver's infamously-high office vacancy rates,
the new construction that was intended to create a demand for
development rights never materialized. Because of this, in
the four years since Denver's ordinance was enacted, only
one transfer has occurred, a transfer of 60,000 square feet
for about $15 per square foot. (77)
The Denver TDR plan has been credited with providing
landmark owners with options they did not have before,
despite the weak Denver market for development rights. For
example, property owners have used their development rights
as collateral for rehabilitation construction loans. In
addition, the introduction of a TDR program has made landmark
designation more palatable to property owners in a city whose
citizens revere property rights. (78)
Conclusion
Existing programs offer several lessons for the authors
of Philadelphia's TDR plan. The first lesson is that TDR
implementation should accompany a comprehensive reform of the
zoning code to insure that TDRs more attractive to developers
than other zoning incentives are as methods of attaining
additional gross floor area. The second lesson is that
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Philadelphia should limit the number of landmark properties
that can participate in the TDR plan to those that are
designated by the Philadelphia Historical Commission and which
are individually listed on the National Register of Historic
Places. Thirdly, Philadelphia's plan should establish sending
and receiving zones in different neighborhoods within Center
City rather than establishing a plan that mandates transfers
to adjacent lots. This will deflect bulk away from
traditionally low-density areas into high-density zones that
can accommodate high-rise development. Fourth, experience with
TDRs in other cities seems to indicate the desirability of
limiting by some percentage or ratio the amount of development
that is permitted on the receiving site. Fifth, development
rights should be able to "float" indefinitely, thereby
permitting transfers to occur in times of weak demand. Sixth,
TDR transfers should be approved subject to the public
recording of a legally-binding document that describes the
maintenance plan for the historic building whose development
rights have been sold. Lastly, the municipal organization that
approves the transfer should reguire that the funds raised
by the transfer be sufficient to maintain the landmark in
perpetuity.
73

DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS IN CENTER CITY HAVE ALREADY
OCCURRED WITHOUT THE TDR PLAN
Even though Philadelphia has no transfer of development
rights program or formal zoning lot merger program,
development rights transfers in Center City Philadelphia have
occurred in at least three cases, due to the creativity of
real estate developers and their attorneys. In a fourth case,
an agreement was reached between two neighboring property
owners that in effect, but not in fact, permitted one of the
property owners to "borrow" the other's air space. The
transfers occurred at Broad and Locust between the low-density
Academy of Music and Academy House, an adjacent, high-rise
residential building; (79) at Sixteenth and Locust Streets
between a nineteen-story, 102,600 square foot building under
construction at 1525-29 Locust Street and the adjacent
building at the northeast corner of Locust and Sixteenth
Streets (1535 Locust Street), a four-story, 1928, Art Deco
building (80); and at Eighteenth Street and the Benjamin
Franklin Parkway between the Four Season's Hotel and the Cigna
Insurance Company's high-rise, office tower. (81) The
"borrowing" of air rights occurred between 1500 Locust Street,
a high-rise residential building and its immediate neighbor
to the west, 1516 Locust Street, a three-story building. (82)
These transfer-of-development-rights cases are not
documented by zoning hearing transcripts, and information
about these cases is withheld from the public by those who
74

participated in the negotiations. However, interviews with
members of the Center City real estate development community
and the City Planning Commission reveal that development
transfers at 1525-29 Locust Street, at Academy House (1429
Locust Street) and at the Four Seasons Hotel/Cigna Insurance
tower were all sanctioned by the Zoning Board of Adjustment.
In the cases of the Four Seasons and the Academy of Music, one
ownership entity owned both parcels of land involved in the
transfer, but this was not the case for the transfer at 1525
Locust Street. (83)
The case that is best documented by the Zoning Board of
Adjustment is the one that is in effect, but not in fact, a
"borrowing" of air rights. It occurred in 1969 between a
narrow, three-story office building at 1516 Locust Street and
its immediate neighbor to the east, the lot designated as
1500-14 Locust Street, once a paved parking lot, now the site
of a thirty-eight story, mixed-use building with apartments,
a parking garage, and retail stores, all known as 1500 Locust
Street
.
The owner of 1500 Locust Street, whose property is zoned
C-5 commercial, proposed the construction of a thirty-eight
story, six-hundred unit apartment building with a 378-space
parking garage and ground-floor retail space on his property.
The proposed structure greatly exceeded the density
limits set forth in the Philadelphia Zoning Code for C-5
Commercial zones. For instance, whereas the zoning code
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permitted a gross floor area of 1200% of the lot area, or
279,360 square feet of building in this case, the developer
proposed constructing a gross floor area of 2826%, or 670,000
square feet of gross floor area. (84) The proposed
development also exceeded the requirement for a rear yard to
be sized 10% of the lot.
There were strong arguments both for and against the
granting of a variance. Arguments against the proposed tower
centered on the tower's enormous bulk. It was perceived that
such an increase in bulk at this intersection could diminish
sunlight, overburden the streets and municipal utilities, and
crowd the neighborhood with new residents. The positive
aspects of the plan were that it would generate substantial
tax ratables, that it was a continuation of the nearby high-
rise development (i.e., that a high-rise at this location was
contextual), that it would attract new residents to the area,
which was in the city's best interest, and that it brought
these residents close to their jobs, thereby reducing the air
pollution and traffic arising from commuting office workers.
Furthermore, the city possessed sufficient water and sewer
capacity to service the building, thereby negating the
argument that the infrastructure would be overburdened. Thus,
the primary negative argximent of merit was that the building
was too massive.
This objection was allayed by two factors that insured
that air and light would always penetrate the neighborhood
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despite the construction of the tower. First, a street lay
behind the building which insured a permanent passage for air
and light. Secondly, the developers negotiated a restrictive
covenant that limited development on the adjacent property,
1516 Locust Street. The agreement stipulates first that the
owner of 1516 Locust will never build on his property above
five stories or eighty-two feet in height; secondly that the
owner of 1516 Locust agrees to have his side windows blocked
up at the expense of the developer of 1500 Locust and thirdly
that if he builds a fourth and fifth floor, it will run up
against the party wall, not have any windows and not restrict
the developers of 1500 Locust from building in excess of
thirty stories. The Agreement also provides that, whereas the
developer of 1500 Locust would pay to block up the windows at
1516 Locust, the owner of 1516 Locust would pay for all
interior finish work required as a result of this alteration
and that the liability for any damage done to 1516 Locust as
a result of the work, would fall upon the owner of 1500
Locust. The agreement concludes by stating, "It is agreed that
this restriction shall act as a Restrictive Covenant to run
with the land." (85)
Another factor besides the restrictive covenant was also
influential in the decision of the Philadelphia Zoning Board
of Adjustment to grant the height variance. This factor is a
traffic engineer's report on the impact of this development
on traffic in the neighborhood. The report found that Locust
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street's actual traffic volume of 415 vehicles per hour
represented 38% of the Street's capacity of 1,083 vehicles per
hour. If the apartment were to add lOO cars during morning
rush hour, it would only increase utilization to 48% of
capacity on Locust Street. Similarly, on I5th Street,
utilization at the time of the study was 652 vehicles per hour
out of a capacity of 883, a rate of 74%. The traffic engineer
concluded that "it cannot be said that the apartment building
will cause a congested traffic condition on either Locust or
Fifteenth Street." (86)
On April 23, 1969, the ZBA, in consideration of the
restrictive covenant and traffic study, granted a variance to
the developers of 1500 Locust Street, permitting construction
of a thirty-eight story building. The variance uses the
phrase "acquisition of air rights" to describe the nature of
the agreement between the property owners. (87) Thus, although
the proposed development surpasses FAR limits set forth in the
Philadelphia Zoning Code, the project was nonetheless found
to be consistent with the comprehensive plan for Philadelphia
and with general economic development policy. (88)
The 1500 Locust Street variance is important because it
indicates a willingness on the part of the City to treat
several, adjacent, separately-owned parcels as a single unit
of density rather than as separate and unconnected units of
density. Therefore, the ZBA will be receptive to development
on certain parcels exceeding FAR limits so long as development
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on adjacent or nearby properties remains below the permitted
FAR. The approval of the 1500 Locust proposal is significant
for other reasons, too. First, it recognized air rights as an
interest in property that is severable from the property.
Secondly, it demonstrates that the developers are willing to
buy air rights to balance densities within the urban fabric
in order to make their proposals palatable to the Zoning Board
of Adjustment. (89) Finally, it is significant because it
shows that the owner of a diminutive building with valuable
superadjacent development potential was willing to restrict
development on his property in perpetuity.
Conclusion
It is noteworthy that these high-density, high-rise
developments have occurred west of Broad Street in an area of
Center City that offers prestigious office and residential
addresses and which offers a diversity of cultural and
commercial amenities, such as proximity to City Hall, the
City's office core and the Academy of Music. That developers
were inventive enough to facilitate development rights
transfers when no TDR plan was enacted and that they chose to
build above densities prescribed by the zoning ordinance
demonstrates that a demand exists for development rights in
Center City Philadelphia in the area west of Broad Street.
This is, therefore, one of Center City's appropriate locations
for both sending sites and receiving areas, as it is
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neighborhood where such transfers have already transpired,
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY. AND PLANNING ISSUES
PRESENTED BY TDR IMPLEMENTATION
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters demonstrate that a TDR Program is
necessary to promote historic preservation in Philadelphia and
that it would benefit the City in several ways. First, it
would preserve historic architecture. Second, it would
preserve the scale and density of entire historic
neighborhoods. Third, it would reinforce the prestige of the
office core by promoting high-rise development. Furthermore,
it would accomplish all of this without burdening the City's
budget and without any reliance upon federal tax incentives.
This chapter, in contrast, demonstrates that the above-
mentioned benefits can only be secured if the TDR Program is
both designed and implemented so as to survive Constitutional
challenges, conform with state law, and avoid negative
planning consequences.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
THE TAKING ISSUE
The primary Constitutional problem associated with TDR
implementation is that the courts may find that a municipal
TDR program violates a section of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution known as the "Taking Clause." This
clause limits government regulation of private property,
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stating "private property [shall not] be taken for public use
without just compensation." (90)
Though the Fifth Amendment seems clear enough, the
Constitution's Tenth Amendment also reserves "police powers"
for the state. The term "police power" refers to "the power
to regulate human conduct- [sic] without any compensable taking
of property- [sic] in order to protect public health, safety,
morals or general welfare." (91) (The operative phrase here
is "without any compensable taking of property;" governments
are entitled to compensate property owners for property
acquisition by using the power of eminent domain.) Thus, the
Fifth Amendment limits the government's police powers.,
ensuring that the state only interferes with private property
rights when regulation advances legitimate state interests.
Some types of police power regulation are so well
accepted, or have such an insubstantial economic impact that
they almost never give rise to a taking issue challenge.
Examples are electrical codes, off-street parking
requirements, and impervious surface restrictions.
Other types of regulation, however, frequently create
such large reductions in property values that they stimulate
taking claims. Examples are those restricting mining,
regulation for the preservation of open space, regulations
that seek to eliminate existing uses, regulations of
flood-prone areas, wetlands, estuarine and beach lands, and
a variety of regulatory deterrents to urban growth. (92)
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As TDR programs will certainly restrict the development
potential of selected landmark properties without compensating
owners for the full value of their properties' development
potential, it is possible that a transfer of development
rights program may give rise to a taking issue challenge.
Thus, the first major constitutional question regarding TDRs
is whether they will compensate owners of historically-
designated properties to an extent great enough to withstand
a taking issue challenge.
The forthcoming discussion of the Supreme Court case of
Penn Central v. New York indicates that a loss in the value
of property, such as that arising from landmark designation
associated with a TDR program, does not necessarily constitute
a taking.
Penn Central Transportation Companv v. Citv of New York . U.S.
104 fl978^
In this Supreme Court case, the appellants were the Penn
Central Railroad, owners of Grand Central Station in
Memhattan. The Penn Central Railroad argued that New York
City's landmark preservation program, which permits the sale
of air rights from designated landmarks, did not offer
sufficient financial compensation for the restrictions imposed
on high-rise development above Grand Central Station. The
Landmarks Commission denied permission for Penn Central's
lessee to construct a multi-story office building above Grand
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Central Station, an historically-designated landmark. Penn
Central filed suit against New York City because the
lessee/developer would have paid $3 million annually to Penn
Central for the right to build and operate this office
building, and the ruling of the Landmarks Commission
eliminated this potential income stream. (93)
In its argument against the landmark law, Penn Central
stated three principal arguments. The first is that the
Landmark Law diminished the property value of Grand Central
Station, as it
"... deprived them of any gainful use of their
^air rights' above the terminal and that,
irrespective of the value of the remainder of their
parcel, the city had ^ taken' their right to the
superadjacent air space, thus entitling them to
*just compensation' measured by the fair market
value of these air rights." (94)
Penn Central's second argument is that the landmark law
interferes with the investment-backed expectations of the
property owners, which predated landmark designation. Its
third argiment is that the "government, acting in an
enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of the property for
some strictly governmental purpose." (95)
In repudiation of the appellant's first claim, which
relates to the diminution of the value of Grand Central
Station, Brennan, expressing the opinion of the Court, pointed
out that mere diminution of property value does not result in
a taking. To substantiate this statement, Brennan notes that
a seventy-five per cent diminution of property value resulted
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from the contested zoning code in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
.
272 U.S. 365 (1926), and a 92.5 per cent diminution of
property values occurred in Haddacheck v. Sebastian, 2 39 U.S.
394 (1915). Both of these Supreme Court cases involved
land-use legislation, and both cases upheld regulatory
statutes and dismissed appellants' charges that takings had
occurred. (96) The Supreme Court notes that legal scholars
have attempted to determine the extent of loss in land values
that is allowed to occur as a result of regulation without it
being determined a taking, but such attempts at quantification
have not yet yielded a consistent ratio of the loss of value
as compared with the value of the land prior to the enactment
of the legislation.
With regard to the second charge, that the ordinance
"sabotaged the owner's investment-backed expectations," the
Court noted that a previous case, Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S.
91 (1909), "...disposed of any contention that the full use
of air rights is so bound up with the investment-backed
expectations of appellants that Government deprivation of
these air rights. . .constitutes a * taking.'" (97)
The Supreme Court next dismissed outright the appellant's
third claim, that the Landmark Law exploits appellant's parcel
for the City's purposes and that it "facilitates [and] arises
from... entrepreneurial operations of the City." (98)
The Court then determined under what circumstances the
interference with the appellant's property would have been of
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such magnitude that an eminent domain proceeding with
compensation should have occurred to achieve the City's
objectives. The Supreme Court determined that an eminent
domain proceeding would only have been necessary if the
Landmark Law had interfered with the present use of the
terminal, which the court considered to be Penn Central's
primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel
.
After dismissing the appellants three principal takings
contentions, the Court presented additional arguments in
defense of the New York City Landmark Preservation Ordinance
and in defense of the Transfer of Development Rights Plan.
Supreme Court Justice Brennan, expressing the opinion of
the Court, writes that
"...there was no 'taking' because the
Preservation Law had not transferred control of the
property to the city, but only restricted
appellants' exploitation of it; and that...(l) the
same use of the terminal was permitted as before;
(2) the appellants had not shown that they could not
earn a reasonable return on their investment in the
Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper
could never operate at a reasonable profit, some of
the income from Penn Central's extensive real estate
holdings in the area must realistically be imputed
to the Terminal; and (4) the development rights
above the Terminal, which were made transferable to
numerous sites in the vicinity provided significant
compensation for loss of rights above the Terminal
itself." (99)
Justice Brennan stated also that jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. Instead, the Supreme Court focusses both
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on the character of the action and on the nature and the
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole. (100)
The character of the action and the nature of the
interference in Penn Central do not substantiate taking issue
claims because, as Brennan points out, the Supreme Court has
recognized that states and cities may enact land use
restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by
preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of
a city.
In its concluding remarks, the Court stated that it was
important to the outcome of this case that the Landmark Law
in New York prohibits only that construction above the
terminal which is inappropriate in terms of scale, material
and character. It does not prohibit "any construction above
the terminal." (101) Finally, the "ability to use these (air)
rights [had] not been abrogated," because the development
rights were transferable to at least eight parcels in the
vicinity of the terminal, and the air rights of the terminal
are valuable.
The first of these two concluding remarks in Penn Central
does not appear to support Philadelphia's TDR plan, which
would disallow all construction above designated, historic
buildings. However, the Opinion in Penn Central later states
that government may compel a property owner to leave a portion
of his land vacant where building would be harmful to the use
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and enjoyment of other land. (102)
"...it has been held unconstitutional to compel
an owner, without compensation, to leave his land
vacant in order to save the land for future public
purchase, but it is within constitutional power to
compel an owner to leave a portion of his land
vacant where building would be harmful to the use
and enjoyment of other land." (103)
The Supreme Court then defined what constitutes a taking.
They stated that,
"An ordinance which permanently so restricts
the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation, and must be recognized as a taking of
the property. (104)
Finally, the Supreme Court also states that the
restrictions imposed by the New York City Landmarks Commission
were,
"...substantially related to the promotion of
the general welfare and not only permit reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site, but afford
appellants the opportunity to further enhance [sic]
not only the terminal site proper but also other
properties." (105)
Penn Central Conclusion
The important lessons from Penn Central for Philadelphia,
as it considers whether or not to implement TDRs, are several:
1) diminution of property value does not constitute a taking;
2) deprivation of air rights does not interfere with
investment-backed expectations of property owners ; 3
)
development rights provide significant compensation for loss
of air rights; 4) the use of the property at the time of
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historic designation must be allowed to continue in order for
a taking not to occur; 5) this use must generate a reasonable
rate of return on the investment; 6) cities may enact land use
restrictions to preserve desirable aesthetic features; 7)
jurisprudence does not divide parcels into discrete segments
and rule that a taking has occurred if rights in one segment
have been entirely abrogated (instead, jurisprudence focusses
on the nature and the extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole); 8) TDR programs do not transfer
control of property to the municipality or facilitate
entrepreneurial operations of the city; and 9) taking claims
based on that supposition are false. Thus, in Penn Central
the Supreme Court ruled favorably toward a properly-designed
TDR program as against a taking claim.
However, decisions by the Supreme Court in late 1987
indicate that the court has become more conservative since the
1978 Penn central decision. Whereas the Court that heard Penn
Central seems to have been sympathetic to government
regulation of private property, even when the case involved
a sizeable diminution of property value, the Supreme Court of
the last few years has come down quite forcibly on the side
of private property owners and against government regulation
of land in two of the three recent taking cases presented
here-
The three cases are Kevstone Bituminous Coal Association
v^ DeBenedictus (107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987)) , Mailan v^ Q^HtomJ^
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Coastal Commission (107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) ) , and First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of los
Angeles (107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)). They are referred to as
Keystone
.
Nollan
.
and First English
, respectively.
Keystone
In Kevstone
.
the Supreme Court rejected a claim by an
association of mine owners that Pennsylvania's 1966 Bituminous
Mine subsidence and Land Conservation Act affected a taking.
The Act authorizes the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources (DER) to enforce and implement
regulations designed to prevent or minimize mine subsidence.
The Act prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to
public buildings, non-commercial buildings generally used by
the pioblic, buildings used for human habitation, and
cemeteries. DER reguires coal mining companies to leave 50%
of the coal in place underneath such buildings and properties.
The Act also authorizes DER to revoke mining permits if
the removal of coal damages a structure or area protected by
the Act, and it provides further remedies by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania in the event that subsidence occurs underneath
any of the buildings or sites protected by the Act.
The mine owners alleged in Kevstone that the Act as
implemented by the 50% rule constituted a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. They assert that Pennsylvania
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recognizes three separate estates in land: the mineral estate,
the surface estate, and the support estate. The title to
approximately 90% of the coal that is or will be mined by the
petitioners in western Pennsylvania was severed from the
surface in the period between 1890 and 1920. Because of this,
the petitioners argue that a separate, recognized interest in
realty, the support estate, had been entirely destroyed by the
passage of the Act.
In making this particular claim, petitioners argued that
the Supreme Court generally considers a taking to have
occurred if a separate and recognized interest in real estate
is rendered completely unusable because of government
regulation. A majority of the Court rejected this argument,
and held that no taking occurs if only a portion of a parcel
of property is taken without compensation.
In Keystone
. the Supreme Court determined that
petitioners were denied use of less than 2% of their coal
reserves; that this 2% could not be deemed a "separate parcel
of property" [regardless of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's
recognition of it as such]; and that a taking claim arising
from this argument must fail
.
"Pennsylvania property law is apparently unique
in regarding the support estate as a separate
interest in land that can be conveyed apart from
either the mineral estate or the surface estate.
Petitioners therefore argue that even if comparable
legislation in another State would not constitute
a taking, the Subsidence Act has that consequence
because it entirely destroys the value of their
unique support estate. It is clear, however, that
our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on
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such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of
property rights. For example, in Penn Central, the
Court rejected the argument that the "air rights"
above the terminal constituted a separate segment
of property for Takings Clause purposes. Likewise
in Andrus v. Allard , we viewed the right to sell
property as just one element of the owner's property
interest. In neither case did the result turn on
whether state law allowed the separate sale of the
segment of property." (106)
Thus, even though the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as of
1990 recognizes development rights as a separate interest in
realty, that fact does not cause a taking to occur if
development rights above a designated historic building are
appropriated by a TDR program for use on another parcel,
provided that compensation accompanies the transfer.
Pointing again to the fact that only 2% of petitioners'
coal reserves were deemed "taken" by the Subsidence Act, the
Supreme Court rejected another argument presented by the
petitioners, namely that the Subsidence Act rendered their
coal mining commercially impracticable and that the Act
interfered with their "investment-backed expectations."
"There is no showing [in Keystone] that
petitioners' reasonable ^investment-backed
expectations' have been materially affected by the
additional duty to retain the small percentage that
must be used to support the structures protected by
[the Subsidence Act]." (107)
Among petitioners' most strategic arguments is their
claim that the Subsidence Act is invalid because it resembles
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's 1920 Kohler Act,
legislation also designed to prevent mine subsidence. The
Kohler Act was struck down as unconstitutional in Pennsylvania
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Coal y^ Mahon (260 U. S. 393 (1922)), a landmark Supreme Court
decision written by Justice Holmes.
The Supreme Court of 1987, however, distinguished
Pennsylvania Coal to legitimize the Subsidence Act. Stating
that the Kohler Act failed because it promoted the private
interests of an individual property owner instead of the
health or safety of the citizens of Pennsylvania, and claiming
in addition that the Kohler Act made it "commercially
impracticable" for the Pennsylvania Coal Company to mine
certain coal, the Supreme Court of 1987 stated that
legislation can effect a taking if it does not "substantially
advance legitimate state interests." (108)
Whereas, in the eyes of the Court, Pennsylvania Coal
merely involved a balancing of the private economic interests
of coal companies against the private interests of surface
owners. Keystone
,
in the eyes of the court, involved
legislation designed to promote important public interests by
minimizing subsidence in certain areas. The Court states
that, because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania acted to
prevent what it perceived to be a threat to the public
welfare, the character of the government action "leans heavily
against a taking." (109) Thus, "...the nature of the State's
action is critical in taking analyses." (110)
The Supreme Court states further that,
"...all property in this country is held under
the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community...,"
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and
"...one of the state's primary ways of
preserving the public weal is restricting the uses
individuals can make of their property. While each
of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we,
in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that
are placed on others." (Ill)
Keystone Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the Subsidence
Act because it did not destroy a separate, recognized interest
in realty; because it did not render the petitioner's coal
mining commercially impracticable; because it did not
materially affect the petitioner's investment-backed
expectations; and because the nature of the state's action was
attuned to promoting health and safety and to preventing a
threat to public welfare, which are all legitimate state
interests
.
Perhaps the most important finding in Keystone from the
standpoint of TDR implementation is the Supreme Court's
apparent stance that a taking would not occur if a TDR program
were to diminish the value of development rights by
appropriating them for use on another parcel , even though
development rights are recognized by Pennsylvania as a
separate interest in realty.
The outcome of Keystone would suggest that the Court is
strongly in favor of upholding legislation that promotes
public health, safety, and welfare even when the legislation
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meets with opposition from powerful private property
interests. However, two more recent cases, Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission (107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987)) and
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles (107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)), indicate that today's
Supreme Court is very much in favor of preserving the
privileges of private property at the expense of public
health, safety, and welfare.
Nollan
In Nollan . the Supreme Court ruled that the California
Coastal Commission violated the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution when it conditioned granting a building
permit to a shoreline property owner, the Nollans, upon their
publicly recording a deed restriction that would permanently
reserve for the public a right-of-way along the beach. The
Nollans intended to replace an existing bungalow with a larger
residence on this site, and the conflict arose when they
applied for a building permit.
The legislation from which this conflict ultimately stems
was the 1976 California Coastal Act, which requires that the
permit for constructing a new coastal house, whose floor area,
height, or bulk exceeds that of the previous structure by 10%
or more, be conditioned on the grant of public access over
the property along the beach. The Act authorizes the
California Coastal Commission to impose these public access
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conditions. The Act only applies, however, where, in the
opinion of the Commission, the proposed development will have
an "adverse impact" on public access to the sea.
The Commission interpreted "adverse impact" to include
the creation of psychological barriers to the use of the beach
and the creation of visual barriers to seeing the ocean, both
of which, they claimed, the new house would constitute. The
Commission asserted that a walkway would mitigate such
negative effects and also alleviate congestion on the beach.
When they received notice of the access requirement, the
Nollans took the case to court, it was received unfavorably
by the California courts and appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that the actions of the
Commission violated the Taking Clause of the Constitution of
the United States for several reasons. First, the Court
determined that a "permanent physical occupation" by the
government occurred in this case.
"We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has
occurred, for the purposes of that rule, where
individuals are given a permanent and continuous
right to pass to and fro, so that real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted presentation himself
permanently upon the premises." (112)
They state that a taking is always found even when such
an occupation "achieves an important public benefit or only
has minimal economic impact on the owner." (113)
In addition, the Supreme Court found that the Coastal
Commission's access requirement fails the takings analysis
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because it "utterly fails to further the end advanced as the
justification for the [access condition]." The Court argued
in substantiation of this claim, that the walkway would not
increase the public view of the ocean.
Since the access requirement would accomplish none of the
legitimate state interests it purported to further, there
existed in Nollan a "lack of nexus between the condition and
the original purpose of the building restriction." (114)
"The lack of nexus between the condition and
the original purpose of the building restriction
converts that purpose to something other than what
it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the
obtaining of an easement to serve some governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation." (115)
In closing, the Court argues that
"California is free to advance its
'comprehensive program' if it wishes, by using its
power of eminent domain for this 'public purpose,'
... but if it wants an easement across the Nollans'
property, it must pay for it." (116)
Nollan Conclusion
Nollan
,
therefore, demonstrates that the current Supreme
Court is determining that legislation constitutes a taking in
the following cases: 1) if the regulation fails to further the
end advanced as its justification; and 2) if the regulation
constitutes a permanent physical occupation of property by the
government. Nollan does not indicated in any way that
deprivation of the use of air rights would constitute a
permanent physical occupation of private property in the eyes
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of the court.
First English
The final Supreme Court "taking issue" case to be
considered here is First English . In this case, the Supreme
Court reversed an earlier decision by the California Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
require compensation for "temporary" takings; i.e., for the
period between the time a land owner claims that his property
has been "taken" by land-use regulation and the time that it
is determined that the regulation constitutes a taking of
private property without just compensation.
The conflict which the First English decision resolved
arose in 1979, when the County of Los Angeles, California
adopted an interim ordinance banning persons from
constructing, reconstructing, placing or enlarging any
building or structure within a flood hazard zone in Mill Creek
Canyon. The ordinance was drafted after a devastating flood
occurred in Mill Creek Canyon in 1978, destroying property in
its path, including Lutherglen, a retreat center and
recreational area for handicapped children owned and operated
by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale,
California.
Among the claims filed by the Church in its suit was
their contention that the ordinance denied the Church "all use
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of Lutherglen." (117) Another claim sought to recover from the
Flood District in inverse condemnation.
Both the California Superior Court and the California
Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's allegations
concerning the ordinance.
The United States Supreme Court remanded to the
California Courts the question as to whether the "ordinance
at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property"
or whether the County's actions were "insulated as a part of
the State's authority to enact safety regulations." (118) The
Supreme Court then set about determining whether the Just
Compensation Clause requires the government to pay for
"temporary" regulatory takings. In this context, the phrase
"temporary regulatory takings" describes situations where
land-use restrictions, such as those imposed on Lutherglen,
are lifted after a victorious challenge eliminates the
restriction.
In reversing the decision of the California courts, the
Supreme Court cites several cases which "reflect the fact that
* temporary' takings. . .are not different in kind from permanent
takings," (119) for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation
.
"* Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that
"takings" must be permanent and irreversible.'" (120)
Furthermore
,
"Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor
ordinance after this period of time, though
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converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is not
a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just
Compensation Clause." (121)
Thus, the Court held that,
"...the Los Angeles County ordinance. . .denied
appellant all use of its property for a considerable
period of years, and we hold that invalidation of
the ordinance without payment of fair value for the
use of the property during this period of time would
be a constitutionally insufficient remedy." (122)
First English Conclusion
First English establishes that compensation is required
for the period between the time a land owner claims that his
property has been taken by land-use regulation and the time
that it is determined that the regulation constitutes a taking
of private property without just compensation.
Justice Stevens notes in his dissenting opinion, that
"The policy implication of today's decisions
are obvious and, I fear, far reaching. Cautious
local officials and land-use planners may avoid
taking any action that might later be challenged and
that might give rise to a damage action." (123)
The outcome of First English does not seem to bode well
for the proposed TDR plan in Philadelphia. However, the
National Trust for Historic Preservation, in its August 1987
newsletter, commented that,
"The significance of First English relates to
the fact that it expands the remedies available for
governmental actions determined to constitute
uncompensated 'takings' of private property for
public use. Consequently, it is likely to provide
additional incentives for challenges to all types
of land use regulation. Nonetheless, it is
essential to recognize that the case does not in any
manner change the law as to what types of actions
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constitute * takings' of private property. Because
preservation ordinances have consistently been
upheld by the courts (including the United States
Supreme Court) against takings challenges, the First
English decision should not discourage local
governments from enacting or applying such
controls." (124)
Thus, although the decision does uphold compensation for
"temporary" takings. First English does not increase the
likelihood that regulatory action will be construed by the
courts to be a taking. Indeed, First English indicates that
the Court has not backed away from the rule laid down in the
Penn Central decision. For the Opinion of the Court in First
English clearly states that its decision relates only to the
case in which "all use of property" is denied. This in no way
reverses the doctrine established in Penn Central that denial
of use of a portion of a property does not amount to a taking.
Since TDRs will only deny use of a portion of property and
will provide limited compensation for this deprivation, the
First English decision should not discourage Philadelphia from
implementing a TDR plan.
United Artists Theater Circuit Inc. v. City of Philadelphia
,
Mo. 48 E.D.. Appear Docket 1990. PA Sup. Ct. . July lo. 1991^
In United Artists , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
reversing a lower court decision, found that application of
Philadelphia's Preservation Ordinance caused an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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It is important to note that the United States Constitution
was not at issue in this case.
In United Artists , the Philadelphia Historical Commission
designated the Boyd Theatre (1908 Chestnut) as an historic
building over the objections of the owner. At the designation
hearing, the city presented testimony that the Boyd Theater
was an important example of art deco architecture by a major
Philadelphia architectural firm and represented a significant
phase in cultural history.
The owner introduced evidence that a historic designation
meant that the owners could not alter or demolish the building
or change the property, either inside of out without the
consent of the Historical Commission, as the Preservation
Ordinance stipulates that designated buildings that are places
of piiblic assembly require a formal commission review of
proposed interior alterations.
Since rendering its controversial decision, the Court has
been asked to review its decision and has held a subsequent
hearing to review the arguments presented by each side on the
tcJcing issue.
The Court was requested by many concerned parties to
review its decision because of the potentially far reaching
implications of their decision. United Artists affects
preservation laws only in Pennsylvania, where its impact is
immediate and significant, yet, in Philadelphia, the status
of approximately 13,000 designated structures remains
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uncertain. In addition, within days of the decision, the
Historical Commission received applications by a single
landlord for three demolition permits on the same downtown
block. Furthermore, five pending historic district nominations
in Philadelphia were postponed indefinitely as a result of
this case.
At the writing of this paper, the final decision of the
Court is still forthcoming.
Taking Issue Conclusions
Whereas United Artists seems to indicate otherwise, the
previous taking issue cases indicate that the courts will not
rule against TDR programs if taking issue challenges are
raised so long as certain conditions are met. These
conditions are: 1) the use of property at the time of
historic designation must be allowed to continue after the new
regulation is imposed; 2) the landmark preseirvation program
must allow designated historic buildings to generate a
reasonable rate of return; 3) this program must not transfer
control of the property to the city; 4) it must not result in
a permanent physical occupation of the property; 5) the
program must not fail to further the end advanced as the
qualification of the condition; and 6) the program must not
deny all use of the historically-designated property.
In addition, certain takings "caveats" must be kept in
mind by the authors of Philadelphia's TDR program, namely: l)
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legislation can effect a taking if it does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests; and 2) legislation fails
the takings analysis if it utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the regulation.
Finally, TDR proponents may defend their programs with
certain statements from the preceding Supreme Court cases:
1) the sale of development rights provides significant
compensation for the loss of air rights; 2) the full use of
air rights is not bound up with the investment-backed
expectations of property owners; 3) air rights above a
building do not constitutes a separate segment of property for
Taking Clause purposes; 4) diminution of property value does
not effect a taking; 5) the nature of state action is critical
in takings analyses, and landmark preservation has repeatedly
been upheld as a legitimate state interest; 6) states and
cities may enact land-use restrictions to enhance the guality
of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic
features of a city; and 7) TDR programs do not arise from or
advance entrepreneurial operations of a city, nor do they
transfer control of property to the municipality.
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THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE
The second Constitutional restraint on the police power
regulation of private property is the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause provides that,
"No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." (125)
The Due Process Clause is relevant to the subject of TDR
implementation because New York City's TDR program has been
challenged before the Supreme Court on due process grounds in
Penn Central (cited earlier) and in Fred F. French Investing
Company v. the Citv of New York . (429, U. S. 990 1976).
Although the due process challenges in Penn Central were
dismissed, they were upheld in the latter case. Furthermore,
the Court in Fred F. French indicated how TDR programs might
avert due process challenges. Thus, knowledge of due process
requirements is essential for successful TDR implementation.
During the century since the drafting of this amendment
and its inclusion in the Constitution, the courts have
clarified and defined the role of the Due Process Clause. The
courts have defined it as that which "protects the property
owner from arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable government
action." (126) Such violative government actions have also
been described as "improperly motivated, unfairly conducted,
or unnecessarily protracted government decision making." (127)
More specifically, the courts have stated that regulations
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can be challenged on due process grounds if they obviously
benefit a narrow segment of the population rather than the
community as a whole. (128)
Certain Supreme Court cases established guidelines for
determining whether or not police power regulation of private
property exceeds due process limitations. For example, the
Opinion in Lawton v. Steele . U. S. 133 (1984) articulated what
is now considered a classic, three-part test for
constitutional due-process. This test reguires that the
public interest justify the interference with land use, that
the means adopted are reasonably necessary to accomplish that
purpose, and that the means are not unduly oppressive on the
property owner. (129)
In deciding due process cases, the Supreme Court
distinguishes between substantive and procedural due process.
Substantive due process pertains to the legitimacy and
substance of a statute and tests whether a legitimate public
interest is served by the statute. Procedural due process, on
the other hand, requires that certain procedures are followed
before the property interest or right can be taken away from
an individual. The Supreme Court case of Goldberg v. Kellv
lists a nvunber of the elements of procedural due process, such
as 1) notice; 2) the opportunity to testify present witnesses
and cross-examine opposing witnesses; 3) an impartial
tribunal; 4) a reasoned decision with findings of fact and
conclusions of law; and 5) an appeal. Due process is violated
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even if only one of these elements is absent from government
action.
The Supreme Court cases in which due process challenges
have been raised against New York City's TDR programs are
described below.
Penn Central
The Penn Central case previously cited in this chapter's
Taking Issue section was one in which several due process
objections were presented. The appellants in Penn Central
raised due process objections to the landmark designation of
their property, claiming that the controls imposed upon them
by the Landmarks Commission apply only to individuals who own
selected properties and that the landmark designation is "
* arbitrary and a matter of taste.— '" " . .
.
,thus unavoidably
singling out individual landowners for disparate and unfair
treatment." (130)
To this charge, the Supreme Court stated,
"...without merit is the ... argument that the
decision to designate a structure as a landmark *is
inevitably arbitrary or at least subjective because
it is basically a matter of taste.'" (131)
Even if it were arbitrary, the Opinion stated, the Penn
Central Railroad had a chance to appeal the landmark
designation of Grand Central Station and a right to judicial
review of any Landmarks Commission decision. (132) Thus, the
Landmarks Commission provided Penn Central with notice of the
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pending landmarks designation, a chance to appeal the
designation, and the opportunity for judicial review. Because
of this, the possibility of a procedural due process violation
was eliminated.
Furthermore
,
"We find no merit in it.... It is true, as
appellants emphasize, that both historic district
legislation and zoning laws regulate all properties
within given physical communities whereas landmark
laws apply only to selected parcels. But, contrary
to appellants' suggestions, landmark laws are not
like discriminatory, or ^reverse spot,' zoning: that
is, a land use decision which arbitrarily singles
out a particular parcel for different, less
favorable treatment than the neighboring ones. In
contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the
antithesis of land use control as part of some
comprehensive plan, the New York City law embodies
a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of
historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might
be found in the city, and as noted, over 400
landmarks and 31 historic districts have been
designated pursuant to this plan." (133)
Furthermore, the Court could not conclude that the owners
of the Terminal had "in no sense been benefitted by the
Landmark Law," (134) as landmark preservation benefits all New
Yorkers and all structures, "both economically and by
improving the quality of life in the City as a whole." (135)
"Doubtless appellants believe they are more
burdened than benefitted by the law, but that must
have been true too of the property owners in
[several other similar Supreme Court cases, namely]
Miller. Haddacheck. Euclid and Goldblatt ." (136)
Penn Central Conclusion
Thus, when one applies the tests stated earlier in Lawton
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V. Steele f due process was not violated in Penn Central . The
public interest justified the interference with land use; the
means adopted were reasonably necessary to accomplish that
purpKJse; and the means were not unduly oppressive on the
property owner. Furthermore, if one applies the test stated
in ool dberq v, Kellv to Penn Central . the elements of
procedural due process were present in the actions of the
Landmarks Commission. They provided notice of the pending
landmark designation, an opportunity for appeal (defense), an
opportunity for tribunal, and a decision.
No Due Process challenges were upheld in Penn Central .
but they were in the next case considered here.
Fred F. French V. Citv of New York
Though potentially one of the most important Supreme
Court case involving TDRs and constitutional due process
requirements, Fred F. French Investing Company v. the Citv of
New York . (350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976)) holds forth a view
subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
First English .
Conclusions
The lesson of this due process case for Philadelphia is
that it may be necessary for Philadelphia to incorporate a TDR
"bank" into its TDR program if it is to survive constitutional
due process challenges. The design of a TDR bank will be
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considered in the ensuing chapter, and the ramifications of
operating a TDR bank are considered in this current chapter
in the section, which discusses the anti-trust liability of
the City.
The due process lessons of Penn Central for Philadelphia
are that landmark laws that single out historic properties for
inclusion in TDR programs are not like discriminatory, or
"reverse spot" zoning. Because Philadelphia's TDR Program
will be part of a comprehensive plan to preserve historic
structures throughout Philadelphia, it will not arbitrarily
single-out parcels for "different, less favorable treatment
than. . .neighboring ones." (141)
In addition, Penn Central demonstrated that the owners
of designated, landmark properties are somewhat benefitted by
landmark laws, as "landmark preservation benefits all
[citizens] and all structures, both economically and by
improving the quality of life in the City as a whole." (142)
For the reasons presented in the preceding two
paragraphs, it is likely that the Supreme Court would rule
that a properly-designed TDR plan in Philadelphia would not
fall short of Constitutional due process requirements.
Finally, a Philadelphia TDR plan will not exceed due
process limitations on the police power if the pxoblic interest
justifies the interference with land use, if the means adopted
are reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of historic
preservation, and if the means are not unduly oppressive on
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the property owners. In addition to these substantive issues,
the TDR program must also possess the elements of procedural
due process, namely notice, defense, tribunal, and decision.
Ill

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The third Constitutional restraint on government
regulation of private property is the guarantee extended by
the Fourteenth Amendment, that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." This section, known as the "Equal Protection" Clause,
guarantees that all persons similarly situated will be treated
alike. (143)
In essence, equal protection jurisprudence asks if it is
rational to treat different classes of persons differently.
By determining what class is harmed by the legislation, what
public purpose is being served by the law, and what
characteristic of the disadvantaged class justifies disparate
treatment, equal protection scrutiny decides whether the
statute has a rational basis and whether
"...an impartial lawmaker could logically believe
that the classification would serve a legitimate
public purpose that transcends the harm to the
members of the disadvantaged class." (144)
Equal protection scrutiny occurs at three levels, which,
ranked from highest to lowest, are, "strict scrutiny,"
"heightened scrutiny," and "rational basis scrutiny."
When a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national
origin, these factors are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are subjected to the "strict
scrutiny" of the courts and will be sustained only if they are
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suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. (145)
Legislative cases based on gender call for a "heightened"
standard of review, as this factor generally provides no
sensible ground for differential treatment.
The following citation defines the third level of equal
protection scrutiny, known as "rational basis."
"The lesson of [ Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Muraia . 427 U. S. 307, 313 (1976)] is
that where individuals in the group affected by a
law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to
interests the state has the authority to implement,
the courts have been very reluctant, as they should
be in our federal system and with our respect for
separation of powers, to closely scrutinize
legislative choices as to whether, how and to what
extent those interests should be pursued. In such
cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a
rational means to serve a legitimate end." (146)
This excerpt helps define the third level of scrutiny,
known as "rational basis" scrutiny, in which the court must
ask of the statute under scrutiny if the classification it
imposes bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest.
Conclusion
This third and lowest level of equal protection scrutiny
is the level at which landmark legislation is reviewed when
brought before the courts. Since historic preservation has
repeatedly been upheld as a legitimate state interest and
since zoning has as well, it follows that a zoning ordinance
that classifies properties in terms of historic and
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architectural significance and which treats these properties
differently from other properties would bear a rational
relationship to the legitimate state interest of preserving
architectural landmarks.
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THE PENNSYLVANIA CODE INDICATES THE MANNER IN WHICH
IMPLEMENTATION OF A TDR PROGRAM IN PHILADELPHIA MUST OCCUR
The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter (Title 351 of the
Pennsylvania Code ) prescribes the manner in which an amendment
to the zoning ordinance must occur. The Charter states that
all such revisions of the zoning ordinance must receive
approval from the Philadelphia City Planning Commision before
the City Council can enact a proposed alteration of the
ordinance, such as TDR implementation. (150)
The Charter provides, furthermore, that the Council may
amend the zoning code if the Planning Commission fails to act
on the proposed amendment within a statutorily-prescribed
period of time. The Charter stresses that Council is the only
body within the government of the City of Philadelphia which
can amend the code; the Planning commission has no such power
of its own. (151)
Thus, nothing inherent in the laws of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania or in the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter
interferes with TDR implementation. And since TDR
implementation is recommended by the Philadelphia City
Planning Commision in the 1988 Plan for Center City , TDR
implementation will depend on the approval of the Philadelphia
City Council.
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THE ANTI-TRUST LIABILITY OF THE CITY LIMITS THE ROLE OF THE
MUNICIPAL TDR BANK
Although the TDR bank, discussed briefly in this
chapter's Due Process section, may ward off due process
challenges, two planning experts warn that improper design of
municipal TDR banks may lead to anti-trust suits against the
City of Philadelphia. For instance, Rahenkamp, in his Analysis
of Historic Preservation Techniques for Center City
Philadelphia
,
states that "— municipalities are not exempt
from antitrust liability;" (152) and Roddewig, in
Transferable Development Rights Programs : TDRs and the Real
Estate Marketplace . goes further, posing the question of
whether the "...creation, acquisition, and disposition of
TDRs by units of state or local government [ s ] [are] subject
to . . . antitrust laws .
"
Illustrating how a municipal TDR bank might violate anti-
trust laws, Roddewig states that,
"For a landowner whose project might not please
government officials, TDRs might be ^unavailable'
or priced so high as to prevent purchase. For a
developer whose project satisfies governmental
bodies, although possibly condemned by the
citizenry, TDRs might be readily available at
bargain basement prices. At present, no adequate
safeguards exist to prevent the government from
running roughshod over the rights of individuals and
communities through the combination of its
regulatory and monetary powers." (153)
Both Rahenkamp and Roddewig 's statements indicate that
Philadelphia's TDR program should be designed so as,
"...not to create any suspicion that
government-owned property, government-held TDRs, or
116

government-favored individuals are being given
noncompetitive [sic] advantages." (154)
Furthermore
,
"If the city created a mandatory system through
which all buyers and sellers had to operate, this
may [sic] be construed as a restraint of trade.
Developers should be free to compete for the
purchase of air rights and sellers free to sell to
whomever they choose, subject to program
parameters regarding the sending and receiving of
development rights." (155)
Thus, since TDR banks are necessary in order to ward
off due process challenges and since banks with exclusive
controls of development rights transactions risk violating
anti-trust laws, development rights transferrers must have
the option to sell their air rights at any time to a
municipal bank. However, it must not be a requirement that
they do so, and they must also be free to sell their rights
on the open market. Likewise, buyers of development rights
should have access to both private and public channels for
development rights acquisition.
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TDR IMPLEMENTATION RAISES SEVERAL PLANNING ISSUES
Several planning issues must be addressed before TDR
implementation can occur, as TDRs have the potential for
creating several negative planning effects in the area
surrounding receiving sites. Center City's receiving sites,
more fully described in the ensuing chapter, will lie along
Market Street, Arch Street, John F. Kennedy Boulevard, and
above the rail yards at Thirtieth Street Station. By
introducing additional height and bulk to these areas, TDRs
may visit such negative effects as the following:
overcrowding that diminishes the penetration of light and
air to the street; traffic congestion on streets, sidewalks,
and public transportation; air pollution; and increased
refuse. Fortunately, Philadelphia's transportation
infrastructure and existing development patterns diminish
these negative planning effects.
For example, as to diminution of light and air, two of
the streets in Philadelphia's TDR receiving zones. Market
Street and JFK Boulevard, are one hundred feet wide and,
therefore, possess sufficient width to permit penetration of
air and light to the street and sidewalk regardless of the
bulk and height of development on receiving sites.
Secondly, as to traffic congestion. Center City's
receiving sites are easily accessible to regional, limited-
access highways. Highway access together with wide streets
will disperse the escalating traffic volume resulting from
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increased development.
Thirdly, also with regard traffic congestion, the
receiving sites' access to mass transportation will minimize
the automotive-traffic impact of new high-rise development
by offering alternatives to automotive commuting.
Finally, with regard to traffic congestion, the fact
that Center City's housing stock lies within walking
distance of the office core means that many office workers
in new high-rise developments will be enticed to forgo
commuting and will live in one of Center City's many
affordable, residential neighborhoods, thereby minimizing
the automotive-traffic impact of new development.
The efficiency of traffic patterns in Center City, the
availability of mass transportation, and the availability of
nearby housing for office workers will also minimize air
pollution by ushering traffic in and out of the city in an
effective manner and by offering alternatives to automotive
travel
.
As for increased refuse in the vicinity of receiving
sites, this may be one of the necessary costs of fostering
high-rise development. However, in general, the receiving
areas possess sufficient infrastructure capacity and
services to accommodate the effects of increased development
that would accompany development rights transfers.
An additional planning consideration related to TDR
implementation is whether or not the TDR program should
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permit development rights transfers between adjacent parcels
of land. Since allowing this to occur would require that
complicated design procedures be established to minimize the
negative aesthetic effects of such a transfer on historic
landmarks, it is preferable to allow transfers only to non-
adjacent sites so that historic sites cannot be compromised
in any way.
The third major planning issue related to TDR
implementation is that TDRs must be integrated with the
zoning code of Philadelphia. The purpose of this is to
eliminate the risk of other zoning bonuses being available
to developers that offer the same floor area awards but at
a lower price than that of TDRs. This issue can be resolved
easily if TDR implementation occurs simultaneously with an
overall revision of the zoning code, such that TDRs are on
an superior footing as compared with other bonuses. Such is
the proposal of the Philadelphia City Planning Commision.
Finally, TDR critics contend that existing height
limitations may be so generous that developers will have no
incentive to use TDRs, thereby rendering the TDR program
superfluous. However, when market conditions are favorable,
it is worthwhile for developers to exceed height limits. For
as the square footage of a development project increases,
several things happen; the per-square-foot development costs
decrease, the cash flow potential increases, and the return
on investment increases. Thus, economics will tend to
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motivate developers to surpass as-of-right height limits,
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CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter has demonstrated that Philadelphia's TDR
Program can survive constitutional challenges, conform with
state law, and avoid negative planning consequences,
provided that the following conditions are met: 1) landmark
designation must not interfere with the present use of the
landmark; 2) the TDR Program and associated landmark
preservation ordinance must permit the landmark to generate
a reasonable rate of return; 3) the TDR Program must secure
the long-term preservation of the landmark, i.e. further the
end advanced as the regulation's justification; 4) the
Program must provide notice, defence, tribunal, and decision
to affected property owners when landmark designation is
pending; 5) a TDR bank must be established, but private
development rights transactions must also be permitted; 6)
the TDR Program must conform with all of the preceding state
and city regulations regarding the alteration of the zoning
code and the administration of the program; 7) the TDR
Program must not transfer control of the property to the
municipality or facilitate entrepreneurial operations of the
municipality or constitute; 8) the TDR Program must not
create a permanent physical occupation of the subject
property; and 9) the TDR Program must be implemented in
conjunction with an overall revision of the Philadelphia
Zoning Code.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSAL FOR A TDR PROGRAM AND SELECTION OF
SENDING AND RECEIVING SITES
INTRODUCTION
As a remedy to recurring demolition, improper alteration,
and neglect to historic resources in Center City, a Transfer
of Development Rights Program should be implemented as part
of the proposed revision of Philadelphia's Zoning Code. This
chapter articulates the proposed TDR Program's overall
objectives and then specifies Program design components that
will advance Program goals.
OBJECTIVES OF THE PROPOSED TDR PROGRAH
The objectives of implementing the proposed TDR Program
may be categorized as preservation, aesthetic, financial,
planning, and legal.
The preservation objective is to safeguard in perpetuity
selected, historic, architectural resources located in the
central business district of Philadelphia from demolition,
neglect, and improper alteration. The aesthetic objective is
to divert high-rise development away from areas where it will
diminish the visual enjoyment of low-density, historic
architecture
.
The financial objectives number in three. The first is
to create and continually to fund an endowment with the
proceeds of development rights sales to provide for the long-
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term maintenance of historic, architectural landmarks. The
second financial objective is to relieve landmark owners of
the financial burdens of landmark maintenance by these means.
The third is for Program implementation to place minimal, and
preferably no, financial burdens on the City of Philadelphia.
As for planning objectives, one is to divert high-rise,
commercial development from historic, low-density areas, where
the transit infrastructure is unsuitable for high-rise
development, to areas where transit and other infrastructure
are sufficient to accommodate increased density. The second
planning objective is to integrate the TDR Program into a
comprehensive revision of the Philadelphia zoning code.
The legal objectives are to accomplish Program goals
without interfering with Constitutionally-guaranteed rights
of property owners, to accomplish Program goals without
violating anti-trust legislation, and to implement the TDR
Program in adherence with procedures set forth in the Statutes
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania governing the
implementation of municipal land-use regulations.
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PROPER TDR PROGRAM DESIGN WILL PROMOTE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The Philadelphia TDR Program will only realize the ten
above-listed objectives if the Program is properly designed.
The principal components of a properly-designed TDR Program
number in eight. They are: 1) exclusive sending-site selection
criteria that select for inclusion in the Program properties
that are both architecturally- and historically-significant
and endangered by demolition; 2) receiving-site selection
criteria that select properties unencumbered by landmarks and
located (a) where additional FAR is of considerable financial
value and (b) where it is desirable from a planning and
aesthetic standpoint; 3) integration of the TDR Program with
the proposed revisions to the Philadelphia Zoning Code, as set
forth in the 1988 Plan for Center City ; 4) a TDR bank to
purchase development rights at times when a rapid, private
transaction is not feasible; 5) administration by the
Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation to enforce
transaction approval standards and preservation covenants and
to ensure that funds generated from development rights sales
are properly managed for long-term asset protection and
growth; and 6) active participation by members of the real
estate profession in promoting the sale of development rights;
7) compliance with Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Statues that
regulate the enactment of land-use regulations; 8) additional
Program provisions that ensure that (a) the proposed TDR
Program does not violate the United States Constitution and
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(b) also ensures that TDR's are preferred over other available
methods by developers as a means to surpass base FARs.
These eight Program features will facilitate the transfer
process. In turn, the transfer process will unleash the
numerous benefits discussed throughout this paper for the City
of Philadelphia, for its residents, and for its rich,
architectural heritage.
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER ONE: EXCLUSIVE SENDING
SITE SELECTION CRITERIA
Among the most critical elements of a successfully-
designed Program is the selection process for sending sites.
Sending sites are landmarks from which development rights may
be severed.
Philadelphia's TDR Program will be engineered such that
the number of properties eligible to become sending sites will
be limited to those properties possessing certain
distinguishing characteristics: 1) location within the area
bounded on the north by the properties along the north side
of Callowhill Street and by the westward projection of its
path were it to meet the Schuylkill River, on the east by the
Delaware River, on the south by the properties along the south
side of Locust Street, and on the west by the Schuylkill
River; 2) location in either a C-4 or a C-5 Commercial Zone;
3) listing as "significant" or individual listing on the
National Register of Historic Places; and 4) listing on the
Philadelphia Register of Historic Places.
By limiting sending site status to such properties,
important Program objectives are realized. First, several
historically- and architecturally-significant landmarks are
selected as sending sites, as is demonstrated on page 133.
Secondly, the number of participating properties is kept to
a manageable level, which limits the supply of development
rights, thereby sustaining development rights prices.
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Exceptions to Sending-Site Selection Criteria
Exceptions to the proposed Sending Site Selection
Criteria are as follows.
First, buildings whose owners had granted facade
easements to the Philadelphia Historic Preservation
Corporation would be ineligible for air rights transfers under
the rules of the facade easement program.
Secondly, the Program would permit exceptions to
criterion Number 2, relating to zoning classification, if the
other three criteria were met and development threatened the
landmark. This provision reflects the fact that high-rise
development pressure has in the past endangered landmark
buildings outside of the traditional boundaries of the high-
rise core of the central business district.
Third, the Program would permit exceptions to Numbers 3
and 4, relating to landmark status, in the event that
development threatened the landmark and in the event that the
endangered landmark were 1) eligible for listing on the
National Register of Historic Places, either individually or
as "significant," and 2) eligible for listing on the
Philadelphia Register of Historic Places.
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RATIONALE FOR SENDING SITE CRITERIA
These sending-site selection criteria have been set forth
because they will expedite TDR Program goals. For instance.
Selection Criterion § 1, pertaining to Program boundaries,
ensures that the Program focuses on the area where the land-
use conflict between high- and low-density real estate uses
has occurred in the past and where it is likely to occur in
the future. Indeed, the boundaries set forth enclose an area
where each of the endangered landmarks discussed in Chapter
Two is located and, furthermore, where each informal TDR
transaction described in Chapter Three has occurred.
Selection Criterion # 2, relating to sending site zoning
classification, advances Program goals in the following
manner. The C-4 and C-5 zoning classifications exert
development pressure on landmark buildings by permitting more
floor area on the landmark parcel than the landmark itself
possesses. This encourages demolition of the landmark and
replacement with a higher-density, more-remunerative
structure. Whereas other zoning classifications may permit
greater density on landmark parcels than what currently
exists, the contrast between the permitted and the existing
density is nowhere more severe than in the C-4 and C-5 zones.
In addition, including in the Program only those
properties that meet other Program criteria and that are zoned
C-4 and C-5 helps to minimize the supply of development
rights. This will maintain prices for development rights at
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levels that will both provide the financial resources to fund
landmark maintenance and that will partially compensate
landmark owners for foregone development opportunities. In
this way, this criterion transforms the heretofore
preservation liability of excess zoning potential into an
asset that can provide for the continued maintenance of the
property
.
Site Selection Criteria Numbers 3 and 4 , which require
that sending sites be listed as "significant" or individually-
listed on the National Register of Historic Places and listed
on the Philadelphia Register of Historic Places, further
minimize the availability of development rights for sale at
any given time in the real estate market. This criterion also
ensures that the most architecturally- and historically-
significant landmarks, as determined objectively by historic
surveys commissioned by the Philadelphia Historical
Commission, are given priority for protection.
In addition, the exceptions to the selection criteria
presented above introduce an element of flexibility into the
Program. They permit the TDR process to occur if exceptional
development circumstances endanger a landmark which does not
automatically qualify as a sending site.
Finally, as a whole, the sending site criteria advance
Program goals because they select some of Center City's most
prominent landmarks. Examples, but not an exclusive list, of
buildings that are located within the boundaries of Callowhill
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street, the Delaware River, Locust Street and the Schuylkill
River; that are zoned either C-4 or C-5; that are listed as
"significant" or individually-listed on the National Register
of Historic Places; that are listed on the Philadelphia
Register of Historic Places; and that have not donated facade
easements to PHPC are:
1) The Rittenhouse Club, 1811 Walnut St;
2) The Swedenborgian Church, 2129 Chestnut (Now
Graduate Health Systems, Inc.)'*
3) The Drexel/Van Rensselaer Mansion (Now Urban
Outfitters), 1800 Walnut Street;
4) 1031 Chestnut Street;
5) The Reading Railroad Terminal and Headhouse at
12th & Market Streets;
6) Lits Brother Department Store (Now Mellon
Independence Center) occupying the north side
of the 700 block of Market Street;
7) PSFS Bank, 700 Block of Walnut Street;
8) The Union League, 140 South Broad Street
through to 15th Street;
9) The Drexel Building, 15th & Walnut Streets;
10) the Arch Street Methodist Church, Broad & Arch
Streets
;
11) Girard Bank, Broad & Chestnut Streets; and
12) Arch Street Presbyterian Church, 1724 Arch
Street
.
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(Source: Philadelphia Historical Commission)
This list is merely representative and not exhaustive,
but listed on it are some of Center City Philadelphia's most
notable historic landmarks. Thus, the proposed selection
criteria for sending sites advance the preservation,
aesthetic, financial, and planning objectives stated earlier
in this chapter.
132

TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER TWO: NUMEROUS POTENTIAL
RECEIVING SITES LOCATED ALONG CENTER CITY'S HIGH-RISE
DEVELOPMENT CORRIDORS
Receiving sites are development parcels whose permitted
gross floor area may be increased through the transfer of
development rights from a historic, sending site. The proper
selection of receiving sites is, like the selection of sending
sites, an important component of the design of the proposed
TDR Program, as it will generate demand from developers for
the development rights above historic buildings.
The objective of the Program, with respect to receiving
sites, is to create a greater FAR capacity within Program
receiving sites than that possessed by sending sites. The
resulting imbalance will generate demand and sustain price
levels for development rights. The process that will generate
this demand is as follows.
When the commercial real estate market in the central
business district of a large city exhibits demand for office
space, retail space, hotels, and other commercial space,
developers respond by attempting to secure as many development
parcels as is possible in areas where maximum rentable sguare
footage is attainable and where maximum rent per square foot
is attainable. In Center City Philadelphia, high-rise
developers look to C-5 sites along Market Street, JFK
Boulevard, and, to some extent, along Arch Street for such
development sites.
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If the receiving sites for the TDR Program are located
in such areas, i. e.
,
where maximum FAR is permitted and where
maximum per sguare foot rent is attainable, developers will
be enticed to propose high-rise developments on these lots so
that they may take advantage of the Program's FAR incentives;
the Program, as a component of the revised Code's zoning bonus
system, will enable these developers to exceed base FARs and,
thereby generate demand for development rights.
Philadelphia's TDR Program receiving sites will lie,
therefore, within the central business district of
Philadelphia and will consist of those properties which are
1) zoned C-5 and 2) located along Market Street from the 7th
Street to the Schuylkill River, along JFK Boulevard, along
Arch Street from Thirteenth Street to the Schuylkill River,
and above the railroad yards servicing 30th Street Station
between Market and Spring Garden Streets.
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RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF RECEIVING AREAS
The reason these areas are proposed as receiving sites
is 1) that zoning is predominantly C-5 along these streets and
in the areas indicated; 2) Market Street and JFK Boulevard are
currently the high-rise corridors of the city; 3) Arch Street
possesses high-rise development potential in certain areas and
is adjacent to existing high-rise corridors 4) Market
Street, JFK Boulevard, and Arch Street are all sufficiently
wide to permit light and air to reach the street, even with
the addition of more high-rise buildings along their flanks;
5) they are serviced by an existing infrastructure of
utilities with capacity for increased utilization, and by an
infrastructure of subways, trolleys, buses, regional passenger
rail, and expressways; 6) Market Street, JFK Boulevard, and
segments of Arch Street are desirable commercial addresses in
the Philadelphia region that command premium office and retail
rents; i.e., additional sguare footage generated by
development rights transfers from historic buildings would be
readily absorbed by commercial tenants at these locations,
provided market/economic conditions were favorable; 7)
compared with other Center City streets, a small number of the
city's endangered, historic resources are located along Market
Street, JFK Boulevard is unencumbered by low-density, historic
buildings, and the few historic buildings within these
proposed receiving areas are generally of sufficient bulk,
and/or height, that they are not visually compromised by high-
135

rise development; i.e., John Wanamaker's Department Store, the
PSFS Tower, Reading Terminal; 8) developers in the past have
utilized the current zoning bonus system for development along
these streets to achieve greater floor area than the base FAR
of 12 permitted by C-5 zoning, and it is conceivable that
future, similar developments, could utilize the TDR Program
for similar purposes; 9) by restricting air rights transfers
to properties along Market Street west of 7th Street,
Independence Mall is compromised to a minimal degree by
potential increases in bulk and height resulting from the TDR
program; 10) by restricting transfers along Arch Street to
Properties west of Thirteenth, the vulnerable social fabric
of Chinatown and valuable landmarks along Arch Street east of
Thirteenth Street are left unthreatened by development; (11)
the railroad yards serving 30th Street Station between Market
and Spring Garden Streets are a logical location for the
reception of development rights because they lie in the path
of the westwardly-expanding, high-rise corridor, they are
well-serviced by a variety of mass transit, Gerald Hines
Interests of Houston, a real estate development firm, has
proposed developing this area with high-rise commercial
buildings, building high-rise structures there would
constitute a visual improvement over its current state, and
this concept is endorsed by the City Planning Commission in
the 1988 Plan for Center Citv ; and, finally, (12) continued
high-rise development for all of the receiving sites proposed
136

herein is endorsed by the Plan . (156)
Thus, the delineation of sending sites and receiving
areas as stated above secures the preservation, aesthetic,
planning, and financial objectives stated in the Introduction
of this chapter. It diverts high-rise, commercial development
away from historic, low-density areas to areas where
sufficient infrastructure exists to accommodate increased
density and where said development will not diminish the
visual enjoyment of historic resources. Moreover, delineation
of sending sites as described above creates an abundance of
property owners eligible to receive the comparatively-limited
number of development rights available from historic
structures. Thus, the price of development is sustained at
levels that will finance the costs of the long-term landmark
preservation.
Both sending and receiving sites are, therefore, selected
to promote the greatest level of activity of development
rights transfer. The sending sites are located where
development is proposed but where it is undesirable, and the
receiving sites are located where development is undertaken
on a monumental scale and where further high-rise development
will visually complement existing buildings.
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER THREE: INTEGRATION OF THE
TDR PROGRAM INTO THE COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF PHILADELPHIA'S
ZONING CODE
The sustained buying and selling of development rights
will be initiated and perpetuated not only through proper
sending and receiving site selection. Integrating the TDR Plan
with the zoning code of Philadelphia will also motivate owners
of sending and receiving sites to participate in the Program
and, thereby stimulate transfer activity. This section sets
forth the manner in which the TDR Program should be integrated
into the Code and sets forth as well further rationale for
such action.
The 1988 Plan For Center City recommends revisions to the
Philadelphia Zoning Code. The present code's objective is to
...ensure adequate light and air to adjacent
buildings and the street, and to foster the creation
of open space at the sidewalk as a means of
accommodating the increase in pedestrians generated
by large buildings. It promotes these objectives
by giving developers bonuses that permit the
construction of additional floor space— in excess
of the base amount allowed— if certain public
amenities are provided as part of the building's
design. These amenities include setbacks from
sidewalks, arcades and open space. Under this bonus
system, designers and developers are given great
flexibility in selecting the amenities they will
provide in exchanges for additional floor area.
(157)
The result of the present code is that new high-rise
buildings often do not contribute amenities to Center City,
save poorly-located plazas, arcades, and open spaces that are
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"of marginal benefit to the public." (158)
The Plan recommends revisions to the C-4 and C-5
classifications in the Zoning Code that would maintain the
level of density currently permitted in these two
classifications, but that would modify the current system so
that
. . . instead of choosing among a variety of
bonuses, as they do now, developers would be
reguired to meet a set of mandatory performance
standards for those aspects of building design that
should be regulated in the public interest." (159)
These proposed mandatory performance standards, as set
forth in the 1988 Plan for Center City, provide that
developers who seek to increase their FAR beyond the base FAR
limits of 5 in C-4 and 12 in C-5 would 1) have property
fronting on two streets of widths 40' or greater, 2) provide
a "critical mass" of continuous public spaces in at least 30%
of the site, 3) provide a fine-arts amenity, 4) provide direct
access to sub-surface transit, where the proposed building
lies over said transit, 5) provide retail space (for buildings
over 300,000 sguare feet), 6) diminish as they rise, and 7)
provide for loading areas and truck docks that are enclosed
by the proposed building. (160)
The manner in which TDRs will be successfully integrated
into the revised Zoning Code is as follows. The Plan proposes
that for C-5 sites located along Market Street and along JFK
Boulevard, additional floor area beyond the base FAR of 12 and
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up to a maximum of 24, would be permitted if the developer
provides the above-listed mandatory performance standards and
provides, as well, "Extraordinary Public Amenities." (161)
Examples of such amenities include public observations
levels at the tops of buildings, mid-block pedestrian
connections between major streets, permanent live-performance
or gallery space, and preservation of historic structures.
Providing one or a combination of these amenities would be
required in addition to providing the seven mandatory
amenities discussed above, were the developer to qualify for
an FAR greater than 12 and up to 24. (162)
TDRs are exceptionally well positioned vis-a-vis these
other extraordinary public amenities to be utilized by
developers as a means of maximizing FAR. Because each of the
other amenities listed is maintenance-intensive, adds to the
construction cost of the project, decreases net rentable area,
complicates building security, possibly adds to public
liability insurance, and generally constitutes an ongoing
obligation for the building owner, TDRs are the most
economical of these amenities. TDRs require no perpetual
maintenance for the owner of the receiving site; they do not
present public visitors into the common areas of the high-rise
buildings; and they do not decrease net rentable floor area.
In essence, TDRs provide for high-rise developers an
opportunity to increase FAR, an opportunity to garner social
and political support for their high-rise projects by
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rendering an amenity unto the public, and no perpetual
obligations regarding that amenity thereafter.
Rationale for Integrating TDRs into the Proposed Zoning Code
Revisions
Integrating TDRs with the proposed revision of the
Philadelphia Zoning Code is not only important from the
standpoint of making the Program profitable for its
participants. It is also desirable, given the findings of
Penn Central v. Citv of New York. U.S. 104 (1978), discussed
in Chapter Four. This Supreme Court case demonstrates that
Philadelphia's TDR Program may risk violating the Egual
Protection Clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment
if it is not part of a comprehensive plan to preserve historic
structures throughout Philadelphia. If the Program is
integrated into a comprehensive plan, it will not "arbitrarily
single-out parcels for different, less-favorable treatment
than. . .neighboring ones, " (163) i.e., violate Equal Protection
rights of property owners.
Rahenkamp, in Analysis of Historic Preservation
Techniques for Center City Philadelphia
, also presents the
argument that the TDR Program must be integrated into a
comprehensive plan.
On a legal basis it appears that a TDR program could
be established in Philadelphia so long as the
sending and receiving districts are set forth in the
Comprehensive Plan. Such action should alleviate
any problem with floating zones, which are not
authorized under the Pennsylvania Zoning Enabling
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Act (sic?). (164)
Thus, the integration of the proposed TDR Program into
the comprehensive plan of the City, i.e., into its Zoning
Code, is necessary, both from the standpoint of the Program's
financial success and its legality.
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER FOUR: THE TRANSFER OF
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS BANK
Fred F. French Investing Company v. City of New York.
(350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976)), discussed in Chapter Four, is
another Supreme Court case that is relevant to the design of
Philadelphia's TDR Program. The zoning amendment referenced
in Fred F. French was struck down and found violative of due
process restrictions because it imposed a "contingency-ridden
arrangement" on the appellant property owner. The development
rights granted to the owners of Tudor Park became a "double
abstraction," whose monetary actualization was subject to "the
exigencies of the market and the contingencies and exigencies
of administrative action." (165)
The inference drawn from the case is that if the property
owners had been compensated immediately for the loss of their
development rights, rather than having their compensation be
subject both to the contingent approvals of administrative
agencies and to the contingencies of the market place, no due
process violations would have been found. Indeed, the
property owners would not have been motivated to file suit.
Therefore, in order to safeguard against violating
property owners' rights as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, and in order to quell property owner's
objections to designation, a TDR Bank will be established as
a component of the TDR Program. The function of the Bank will
be to purchase development rights from owners of sending sites
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at times when the demand for development rights from
developers is weak or absent, and at times when approval
processes for proposed developments are drawn out over long
periods of time.
When the development approvals are finally obtained, the
developer will purchase the necessary development rights from
the TDR bank, replenishing its financial resources so that it
might facilitate more transfers. In the intervening period,
the owner of the historically-designated site will have been
compensated in part for the deprivation of the sending site's
development potential
.
A TDR Bank is an important component of the Program for
reasons other than its bringing the Program into compliance
with the Constitution. Establishing and operating a TDR bank
is good business practice, as it sends a message to the
business community that the authors of the Program recognize
the financial agenda of the property-owning constituency in
Center City. Since property owners will be deprived of their
superadjacent development potential at the moment of
designation and at the moment the TDR transaction is ratified
and then burdened in perpetuity with maintenance, their timely
reimbursement for these sacrifices adds respectability to the
plan from a business standpoint, which will certainly expedite
the approval of the Program by its City Council.
However, Chapter Four also established that if
Philadelphia created a mandatory system through which buyers
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and sellers were required to operate, it might be construed
as a restraint of trade and violative of federal anti-trust
legislation. Therefore, whereas participants in the
Philadelphia TDR Program will have the option at any time to
sell their development rights to the municipal TDR bank, they
will also have the option of selling development rights on
the open market without the services of the TDR bank.
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER FIVE: ADMINISTRATION OF
THE TDR PROGRAM BY THE PHILADELPHIA HISTORIC PRESERVATION
CORPORATION
In order that the government of the City of Philadelphia
not be burdened financially by the implementation of the TDR
Program, the administration of the TDR Program must be
entrusted with compensation to the Philadelphia Historic
Preservation Corporation (PHPC).
PHPC's role in the proposed program would be to ensure
the following:
1) that proposed transfers involve only properties
eligible as sending and receiving sites;
2) that each development rights transaction be
contingent upon its generating sufficient funds to
ensure the long-term preservation of the
participating landmark structure;
3) that the owners of sending sites publicly record
deed restrictions prohibiting any development super-
adjacent to the subject landmark, which deed
restrictions will run with the land;
4) that the covenants of the deed restriction placed
on the title of the sending site are upheld;
5) that the proceeds of development rights sales were
entrusted to a respected financial management firm,
such that these funds will provide for the costs of
landmark maintenance in perpetuity; and
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6) that a TDR bank be established and operated by PHPC.
PHPC's role will not extend to that of ensuring that the
preservation covenants placed upon the sending site are
upheld. This is the role of the Philadelphia Historical
Commission.
For its responsibility in the TDR process, PHPC will
receive an annual fee, part of the dividend from the fund set
up to maintain the landmark, and an initial fee from both
buyer and seller of development rights upon settlement of each
transaction.
Rationale
PHPC should administer the program because: 1) the city
government cannot afford the financial burden of administering
a TDR program; 2) PHPC is experience in the management of a
successful facade easement program that has received donations
from numerous Center City landmarks, and TDRs are very similar
in nature, both in terms of the initial transaction and in
terms of the long-term enforcement of preservation covenants;
and 3) landmark owners, due to their profit-motive
sensibilities, cannot be entrusted with the task of enforcing
covenants that compromise the future development potential of
their sending site properties.
Entrusting the TDR Program to PHPC both advances not only
Program administrative goals, but also financial and legal
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goals, the most significant of which is placing no or minimal
financial burden on the City.
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER SIX: THE REAL ESTATE
BROKERAGE COMMUNITY AND TDRS
The real estate brokerage community must be permitted to
broker the sale of development rights as they now broker
leases and land and building transactions. The sale of
development rights poses no greater challenge to the real
estate community than the leasing of commercial space and the
selling of land and buildings, and the participation of
brokers in the Program will accelerate its acceptance in the
business community and considerably enliven the Program.
Therefore, the real estate industry should be permitted to
list the availability of development rights, to establish
prices for development rights, to represent the interests of
both buyers and sellers during negotiations, and to profit
from the Program through commissions on sales of development
rights. Transactions proposed and brokered by members of the
real estate community must be sanctioned by the Philadelphia
Historic Preservation Commission, however.
PHPC Will be Guaranteed a Three Per Cent Comaission on Each
Transaction of Development Rights
The real estate brokerage community and PHPC can work
together successfully to promote the TDR Program if certain
rules are set forth at the outset of the Program, determining
the rates of compensation for Program participation. This
section sets forth such guidelines.
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If the Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation
sells development rights owned by one property owner to a
second party without the assistance of a real estate broker,
it will receive a six per cent cominission on that sale. If
an individual property owner sells development rights without
the assistance of PHPC, PHPC will receive a three per cent
commission on that sale. If a single real estate broker
orchestrates the sale of development rights from seller to
buyer, PHPC receives a three per cent commission, and the
broker receives a three per cent commission. If a broker and
PHPC each represent parties in the sale of development rights,
they each receive three per cent of the sale. If a broker
cooperates with another broker in the sale of development
rights, they each receive 1.5 per cent of the proceeds of the
sale as their commission, and PHPC receives 3 per cent of the
proceeds of the sale.
This aspect of the Program is designed to generate
operating income for PHPC such that it can administer the TDR
Program and further the objective of not burdening the City
with the administration of the TDR Plan. It is also designed
to entice members of the real estate community to participate
in the Program, by offering attractive financial incentives
to do so.
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN CX>MPONENT NUMBER SEVEN: ENSURING THAT THE
TDR PROGRAM COMPLIES WITH COMMONVflEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
REGULATIONS FOR THE ENACTMENT OF LAND-USE REGULATIONS
Compliance with Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Statutes and
the Pennsylvania Code is a necessary component of TDR
Implementation. Compliance with applicable Pennsylvania
Statutes consists of the following:
(a) ensuring that development rights are
conveyed by a deed duly recorded in The Recorder of
Deeds Office in Philadelphia's City Hall; (166)
(b) ensuring that "The recorder of deeds shall
not accept for recording any such instrument of
conveyance unless there is endorsed thereon the
approval of the municipal governing body having
zoning or planned residential development
jurisdiction over the land within which the
development rights are to be conveyed, dated not
more than 60 days prior to the recording." (167)
(c) ensuring that no development rights are
transferred beyond the boundaries of the City of
Philadelphia. (168)
Whereas the laws of the Commonwealth ensure the legality
of TDRs in Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter
(Title 351 of the Pennsylvania Code ) prescribes the manner in
which an amendment to the zoning ordinance must occur. The
Charter states that all such revisions of the zoning ordinance
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must receive approval from the Philadelphia City Planning
Commision before the City Council can enact a proposed
alteration of the ordinance. (169)
The Charter provides, furthermore, that the Council may
amend the zoning code if the Planning Commission fails to act
on the proposed amendment within a statutorily-prescribed
period of time. The Charter stresses that Council is the only
body within the government of the City of Philadelphia which
can amend the code; the Planning Commission has no such power
of its own. (170)
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TDR PROGRAM DESIGN COMPONENT NUMBER EIGHT: ADDITIONAL TDR
PROGRAM PROVISIONS
The previous chapters, including those discussing
constitutionality and legal issues associated with TDRs, and
other chapters, established certain additional provisions that
should not be absent from Philadelphia's TDR program. They are
as follows:
First, the use of the sending site at the time of
historic designation must be allowed to continue in order that
a taking not occur. This use must generate a reasonable rate
of return.
Second, historic designation and the accompanying
deprivation of development potential must not be imposed on
the owner of the sending site without the elements of Due
Process being present, namely notice, defense, tribunal and
decision; property owners should have the opportunity to
appeal historic designation and participation in the TDR
Program.
Third, the Philadelphia TDR Program should not permit
adjacency transfers. This is implicit in the design of the
Philadelphia TDR Program, though not explicitly stated, and
is a feature that distinguishes it from the New York TDR Plan.
As opposed to New York's Plan, the Philadelphia Program's
sending and receiving sites are set forth to avoid the visual
juxtaposition of high- and low-density uses. However, similar
to other TDR programs, including New York's, Philadelphia's
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Program will permit transfers to be made to either one or to
several different parcels until the authorized FAR of the
landmark lot is exhausted.
Fourth, the TDR Program must include other provisions to
ensure that TDRs are the most enticing means to increase FAR
in the revised Zoning Code. Although TDRs enjoy innate
advantages over the other "extraordinary public amenities"
listed in the 1988 Plan for Center City
^
one further provision
could insure that development rights were preferred over other
amenities as a means of obtaining maximum FAR, namely
accelerating the review process for high-rise developments
that participate in the TDR program.
Accelerating the review process will entice developers
to purchase development rights. Because it will present
financial benefits to developers by hastening the occupancy
of the proposed high-rise buildings, accelerating the review
process will thereby hasten the arrival of the day when
positive cash-flow begins and when negative cash-flow,
resulting from carrying large projects through the approval
process, ceases.
Fifth, the Program will also promote participation by
offering preferential tax treatment for those property owners
who have relinquished their rights to superadjacent
development.
Thus, TDRs, through innate advantages and by offering
accelerated review processes and preferential tax treatment
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for sending site owners, will be the method of choice for
developers who wish to increase their FAR from 12 up to 24.
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THE TRANSFER PROCESS
The transfer process need not be described in detail, as
it approximates the sale of commercial land in almost every
manner. It deviates from typical commercial real estate
transactions, however, in that it must be approved by PHPC.
PHPC's principal function in the process is to ensure that the
cash value of the sale of development rights will net enough
money to maintain the landmark in perpetuity and to ensure
that a deed restriction that runs with the title of the
sending site is publicly recorded in City Hall.
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CONCLUSION: THE PROPOSED TDR PROGRAM DESIGN SUITS THE
CHARACTER OF THE CENTER CITY PHILADELPHIA REAL ESTATE MARKET
AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CURRENT PRESERVATION DILEMMA IN
CENTER CITY
The proposed Transfer of Development Rights Program
described in this chapter presents a realistic method for
reaching the ten objectives stated in the Introduction of this
chapter
.
The preservation objective, that of safeguarding
landmarks in the urban core in perpetuity, will be achieved
by 1) drawing sending site boundaries that encompass historic
areas within or adjacent to the central business district; 2)
by offering financial compensation to landmark owners that
will constitute a financially-attractive alternatives to
demolition, neglect, and improper alteration; and 3) by
enforcing the Program's preservation restrictions and deed
covenants that will enjoin demolition, improper alteration,
and neglect.
The aesthetic objective, that of diverting high-rise
development where it will not diminish the visual enjoyment
of historic architecture, is accomplished by 1) establishing
sending site boundaries that enclose an area where the bulk
of landmarks with excess development potential exist and 2)
by establishing receiving zones a) where increased density
will not displace landmark structures and b) where existing
landmarks are of such size and stature that high-rise
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construction will not compromise them.
The three financial objectives articulated in the
Introduction of this Chapter will be realized because the
Program raises cash through development rights sales to: 1)
create a maintenance endowment for each landmark; and 2)
reimburse PHPC for the administration of the Program, thereby
relieving the City of any potential financial burdens.
The planning objectives are met through: 1) establishing
Program boundaries that divert high-rise development to areas
with sufficient infrastructure to absorb development; and 2)
through integrating the TDR Program into the zoning, planning,
and administrative framework of the City, thereby eliminating
the possibility that the Program conflicts with other zoning
and preservation measures adopted by the City.
Finally, legal objectives are realized by integrating the
Program into the zoning code, by creating a TDR Bank, and by
permitting transfers to occur without the TDR Bank's
involvement.
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CHAPTER SIX; FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
Implementing a Transfer of Development Rights Program in
Center City Philadelphia is necessary, feasible, and
desirable. It is necessary in order to reconcile the
Philadelphia Historical Commission with owners of
commercially-zoned landmarks. Reconciliation between these
parties is essential to the continued designation and
preservation of historic landmarks in Center City. As previous
chapters have demonstrated, implementation is feasible from
administrative, financial, planning, and legal standpoints.
Implementation is desirable for several reasons, among them
that it transforms the heretofore liability of excess zoning
into a financial asset for landmark protection, and it will
also improve the commercial environment and the quality of
life in Center City, as well.
Chapter Six elaborates upon these findings and sets
forth, as well, predictions and conclusions as to the effect
of the current economic and political climates on the proposed
TDR Program.
TDK IMPLEMENTATION IS NECESSARY
TDR implementation is necessary for several reasons.
First, it is necessary to reconcile landmark owners with the
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Philadelphia Historical Commission.
Existing preservation legislation enforced by the
Philadelphia Historical Commission places restrictions on the
alteration and demolition of designated landmarks but offers
no compensation for this inconvenience. Disputes arising from
this legislation have taken the form of litigation, which, if
successful, may overturn the Commission's powers of
designation, thereby denying the City of its only means of
protecting landmarks. Furthermore, lawsuits against the City
arising from the Historical Commission's designation activity
place Philadelphia in a position of possible liability for
millions of dollars in damages.
TDRs offer owners of designated landmarks financial
compensation to offset the effects of designation. Because
of this, landmark owners in C-4 and C-5 zoning districts of
Center City, where temptation to demolish landmarks is
greatest, will no longer have reason to challenge historic
designation by bringing suit against the City. In addition,
the City will be able to maintain control over the fate of
landmarks within its boundaries.
TDR implementation is also necessary if investment in
historic buildings in Center City is to resume. TDR
implementation will revive interest in investing in historic
buildings by egualizing the financial standing of landmarks
as real estate investments with that of new commercial
buildings. As Chapter Two demonstrates, investment dollars in
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real estate since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have tended
towards high-income/high-ef f iciency , new construction and away
from historic structures. This has occurred because returns-
on-investment for historic buildings, under current tax law,
are inferior when compared to those of newer commercial
structures, as maintenance costs tend to be higher for
landmarks than they are for newer structures and because
historic buildings also tend to have lower per-square-foot
rents than newer structures, as well as lower net-to-gross
ratios of rentable space.
TDR Implementation can equalize the financial standings
of landmarks and newer structures because the financial
proceeds resulting from the sale of development rights will
provide for the continued maintenance of sending-site
landmarks. If the proceeds are managed properly, it is
conceivable that they may not only fund landmark maintenance,
but also compensate for inferior landmark cash-flow.
TDR implementation is also necessary because it
guarantees two important gains for historic buildings that may
not otherwise occur if a landmark is involved in an informal
transfer. First, TDR implementation guarantees that the
transfer be contingent upon its generating sufficient funds
to finance the landmark's renovation or to endow the
maintenance of the building in perpetuity. This has not
occurred to date in any of the informal transfers in Center
City. Secondly, TDR implementation guarantees that adjacency
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transfers will not occur. Adjacency transfers have occurred
as a result of informal transfers, as with Academy House and
the Academy of Music and with 1500 Locust and 1515 Locust
Street. The former transfer substantially diminished the
public's visual enjoyment of the historic Academy of Music.
Lastly, with regard to informal transfers, TDR
implementation is necessary because, whereas some informal
transfers have occurred in advance of Program implementation,
many more transfers might occur were a Program available, as
implementation would promote the concept actively in the
business and real estate commtmities.
TDR Implementation is also necessary for the fulfillment
of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission's 1988 Plan for
Center Citv . The Plan envisions revitalizing Philadelphia by
both encouraging growth and by reinforcing the historic fabric
of the City. TDRs present a method by which growth and
preservation can coincide and reinforce one another.
Also if the Plan is to succeed in its objective to
balance densities throughout the City, then the TDR Program
as proposed in this thesis must be implemented.
Finally, the unifying reason as to why TDR Program
implementation is necessary is that it holds forth the
possibility of sustaining the preservation movement in a time
when it lacks a mechanism to carry out its mission.
162

TDR IMPLEMENTATION IS FEASIBLE
The second finding of this thesis is that implementing
a TDR Program is feasible. Despite numerous obstacles and
potential pitfalls, implementation can be accomplished to the
satisfaction of constitutional standards, and it is feasible
from planning, financial, and administrative standpoints, as
well.
One of the factors that contributes most to the
feasibility of the proposed TDR Program is that its design
responds to the shortcomings of previously-enacted TDR
Programs in other major U.S. cities.
For instance. New York's TDR Program is very difficult
to utilize, as it permits only adjacency transfers and
transfers within continuous chains of property ownership, and
the New York City zoning ordinance permits too many alternate
methods besides TDRs for developers to increase FAR. San
Francisco, on the other hand, enacted strict height
limitations soon after the implementation of its TDR Program,
obviating TDRs in that city. As for the modest performance of
Denver's TDR Program, that city's real estate crash rendered
its TDR program almost unusable.
Philadelphia's proposed TDR Program avoids these
shortcomings in several ways. In response to the shortcomings
of the New York TDR program, Philadelphia's Program, as
proposed herein, would only be implemented in concert with a
comprehensive and complementary revision of the zoning code,
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which will ensure that TDRs are a favored method of developers
for maximizing FAR. Philadelphia's TDR Program would also not
permit adjacency transfers. By doing so. Program financial
feasibility is furthered, as costly review processes before
the Planning and Historical Commissions would not be needed
as they are in New York, as no risk exists that high-rise
buildings will tower over landmarks.
In response to shortcomings in the San Francisco TDR
Program, Philadelphia's Program would, as mentioned above,
only be implemented in concert with a comprehensive revision
of the Philadelphia Zoning Code. Thus, Philadelphia's TDR
Program would not suffer the fate of San Francisco's Plan,
where height limits and annual square footage limits were
placed on new construction soon after its enactment.
With respect to the economic circumstances that
negatively affected the Denver TDR Program, Philadelphia's
Program will be implemented in a region of this Nation which
is economically diversified and not generally subjected to
extreme economic fluctuations, as are the rule in economies
such as Denver's. Downturns in the local construction and real
estate segments of the economy do occur in Philadelphia, as
we are presently witnessing, but they are generally not as
severe as those experienced by cities, such as Denver, that
are predominantly dependent upon a few key industries.
The feasibility of TDR implementation is also promoted
by factors available in the Philadelphia real estate market,
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namely the desired imbalance between an overwhelming number
of potential high-rise development sites (especially when 30th
Street Station is taken into account) and a significant, but
limited, number of landmarks meeting all of the sending-site
selection criteria set forth in the previous chapter. This
imbalance is a prerequisite for program success, as a greater
number of receiving than sending sites ensures that prices for
development rights will be high enough to 1) encourage
landmark owner participation in the Program and 2) generate
sufficient funds to ensure preservation of the sending site.
Besides responding correctly to the shortcomings of other
Cities' TDR Program designs, the proposed TDR Program in
Philadelphia is feasible from Constitutional standpoints, as
well.
Constitutional Feasibility: The Taking Issues
Philadelphia's TDR Program, as proposed herein, is
feasible from the standpoint of requirements set forth in the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The manner in which
TDRs avert takings claims is many fold.
First, TDRs present a method of providing compensation
to owners of designated properties. In fact. United Artists
presents an example of how the implementation of a TDR Program
might avert taking claims by offering compensation to owners
of designated properties. Had just compensation been provided
to the owners of 1908 Chestnut Street, they might not have
165

filed suit against the City. The owners had sought a
demolition permit as early as 1987. Had their development
rights been saleable, they may have found several parties
interested in purchasing these rights, as the late 1980s was
a period of significant high-rise development and real estate
speculation in Center City. Being able to sell their
development rights may have changed the balance sheets for
1908 Chestnut, such that the owners may have found
preservation of be a money-making proposition.
Since the Takings Clause prohibits deprivation of private
property without just compensation, the payment of an amount
of cash to landmark owners that represents the value of their
development rights on a similarly-zoned parcel in the
commercial core of Philadelphia is just compensation. (See
pp. 179-180)
Second, TDRs do not constitute a taking because, from the
standpoint of the Supreme Court, they do not interfere with
a landmark owner's investment-backed expectations. Whereas the
Court recognizes that TDRs do interfere with the full use of
air rights, the Court has ruled, nonetheless, that the full
use of air rights is not bound up with investment-backed
expectations
.
Third, TDRs do not interfere with the present use of the
property. A taking would occur only in the case where
designation interfered with the present use of a landmark
property
.
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Fourth, even though Pennsylvania recognizes air rights
as a separate interest in real estate, their appropriation for
use on another property does not constitute a taking, per
Supreme Court rulings.
Fifth, because the nature of the state's action is
critical in takings cases, TDR implementation passes another
takings feasibility test. In the case of TDRs, the nature of
the state's action is attuned to promoting legitimate state
interests, namely enhancing the quality of life by preserving
the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city.
Furthermore, landmark preservation has repeatedly been upheld
by the courts as a legitimate state interest.
Sixth, a permanent physical occupation of property is
another indication of a taking, and none of the cases
discussed in this paper indicates that the proposed Program's
acquisition of air rights would be considered by the courts
to be a permanent physical occupation of property.
Lastly, TDRs promise to achieve the end advanced as the
justification for the deprivation of development potential,
thereby passing another takings feasibility test.
Thus, feasibility from the standpoint of the
Constitution's Takings Clause is assured.
Constitutional Feasibility: The Due Process Issue
Philadelphia's TDR Program, as proposed herein, is
feasible from the standpoint of requirements set forth in the
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Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. TDR Program
implementation is feasible from a due process standpoint, in
part, because the elements of due process, namely notice,
defense, tribunal, and decision, are present in the Historical
Commission's process of nominating and certifying buildings
as historic. Listing on the Register is also one of several
prereguisites for landmark participation in the TDR Program.
Since the Historical Commission, in its designation process,
satisfies the due process requirements set forth above, the
TDR Program benefits from this.
The Program passes due process scrutiny for other
reasons, as well. For example, the process of landmark
designation is not arbitrary in Philadelphia; it is a part of
the City's comprehensive plan. Secondly, the public interest
justifies the interference in land use that is carried out by
the TDR Program; historic preservation presents economic as
well as cultural benefits to cities. Thirdly, the means
adopted (depriving landmark owners of superadjacent
development potential and paying them cash to maintain their
landmarks) are reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals
of historic preservation. Fourthly, these means are not
unduly oppressive on the property owner; the present use of
landmarks is permitted to continue, and financial compensation
is provided for loss of development potential
.
Lastly, and perhaps most critical, since Philadelphia's
proposed TDR Program includes provisions for a TDR bank,
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potential due process violations are avoided, as the bank will
ensure timely compensation to sending site owners.
Constitutional Feasibility: The Equal Protection Issue
Philadelphia's TDK Program, as proposed herein, is
feasible from the standpoint of requirements set forth in the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The reason for this is that historic preservation has
repeatedly been upheld as a legitimate state interest and
since zoning has as well, it follows that a zoning ordinance
that classifies properties in terms of historic and
architectural significance, and which treats these properties
differently from other properties, bears a rational
relationship to the legitimate state interest of preserving
architectural landmarks. It is likely, therefore, that the
proposed TDR Program would not be found violative of equal
protection guarantees.
The Pennsylvania Code Indicates the Manner in which
iBplenentation of a TDR Program in Philadelphia Must Occur
The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter
, discussed in Chapter
Four, prescribes the manner in which a TDR Program may be
implemented in the City of Philadelphia. The Charter states
that all such revisions of the zoning ordinance must receive
approval from the Philadelphia City Planning Commission before
the City Council can enact a proposed alteration of the
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ordinance, such as TDR implementation.
TDR Implementation is Feasible from a Planning Standpoint
The planning feasibility of the proposed TDR Program
presupposes a simultaneous and comprehensive revision of the
Philadelphia Zoning Code in accordance with reforms set forth
in the 1988 Plan for Center City . Comprehensive reform as
envisioned by the Plan would promote the planning feasibility
of TDRs by ensuring that they are utilized to the greatest
extent possible, which will, likewise, promote the Plan ts
objective of balancing preservation with growth. An example
of an aspect of comprehensive reform of the Code is the
elimination of Zoning Lot Mergers, as this method of
surpassing base FARs competes with the Transfer of Development
Rights
.
In addition to this proposed revision to the zoning code,
there are factors already in existence that promote the
planning feasibility of the proposed TDR Program. Two such
factors are sufficient infrastructure capacity to accommodate
high density development in receiving site areas and numerous
potential sending and receiving sites, which will fuel Program
transfer activity.
As to a comprehensive reform of the Zoning Code,
including TDRs into such reform would position TDRs favorably
vis-a-vis alternate zoning amenities, such that TDRs would be
the most expeditious and the most financially-compelling
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method of maximizing FAR. Comprehensive reform would also
ensure that TDRs would not be rendered ineffectual as they are
in New York and San Francisco. In the former case, TDRs are
very difficult to utilize, and numerous other zoning amenities
are both easier to utilize and also yield the same result as
TDRs. In the latter case, San Francisco enacted height
restrictions soon after adopting a TDR plan, thereby obviating
TDRs.
The planning feasibility of TDRs is no where more
apparent, however, than in a discussion of the Program's
relationship to Center City's infrastructure. Increases in
density in the high-rise district of Center City resulting
from the Program can be accommodated by the existing
infrastructure of sidewalks, streets, expressways, regional
rail, subways, trolleys, buses, and sewers and other
utilities.
Likewise, as TDRs will increase density in the high-rise
section of Center City, so will they proportionately stabilize
the density in historic sections of the commercial core of
Philadelphia. Both are objectives of the Plan , in which TDRs
play an essential role, and the stabilization of density in
Center City's historic areas bears a rational relationship to
the infrastructure capacity of these traditionally-low density
areas
.
TDRs are feasible from a planning standpoint, as well,
because low-density, historic buildings with excess
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development potential abound in Center City. Chapter Five
lists fourteen such sites, which are merely representative.
Moreover, numerous high-rise development sites still exist in
Center City, including but not limited to the entirety of the
Thirtieth Street Station Yards, the 1700 block of JFK
Boulevard (north side) and several sites along Market Street
in the 800, 900, 1000, 1100, 2100, 2200, and 2300 blocks along
the south side, and in the 2100 and the 2200 block along the
north side.
Finally, TDRs are feasible from a planning standpoint
because, as it is mentioned above and in Chapter Four, TDR
Programs are sanctioned for implementation by Statutes of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the proposed
Program can be implemented in the traditional manner in which
the zoning ordinance is amended, i.e., through approval by
City Council.
TDR iBpl^Bentation is Feasible tram a Financial Standpoint
TDR implementation is financially feasible because the
Prograun will generate sufficient funds to establish
maintenance endowments for historic buildings. These
maintenance endowments will appreciate in value as buildings
age, providing for landmark preservation in perpetuity. TDRs
also offer financial compensation to the administrative
organization that will oversee TDR transactions, the
Philadelphia Historic Preservation Corporation. This, in
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turn, promotes Program financial feasibility because it
eliminates the need for City involvement, which is too
expensive for the City government at this time.
TDR Implenentation is Feasible from an Administrative
Standpoint
TDR implementation is administratively feasible because
the day-to-day administration of the Program will be
undertaken by the Philadelphia Historic Preservation
Corporation. PHPC has relevant past experience in running
programs of a similar nature. Particularly relevant is its
experience in working with facade easement transactions over
the past several years. Their undertaking Program
administration will ensure that the budget of the City of
Philadelphia will remain unburdened by the Program's
operation, and this is the essence of Program administrative
feasibility.
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TDR IMPLEMENTATION IS DESIRABLE
The third finding of this thesis is that TDR
implementation is desirable. TDRs are desirable because they
will help preserve Philadelphia's architectural heritage,
which has tremendous cultural, educational, and economic
value.
TDRs' capacity to protect the City's architectural
heritage derives principally from the financial benefits that
the Program presents. These financial benefits include the
transformation of the heretofore liability of excess zoning
into a financial asset that promotes landmark protection; the
distribution of the cost of preservation among many
constituencies; easing of the conflict between landmark owners
and the Historical Commission; and compensation for the
shortcomings of existing preservation legislation.
Aside from these financial considerations, TDRs are
desired by both real estate developers and owners of low-
density, historic structures; they are desirable because they
will generally improve the commercial environment and the
quality of life in Center City; and they will not only
facilitate preservation, but also the development of the urban
skyline, which is an important civic asset.
TDRs Preserve Philadelphia's Architectural Heritage
Implementing a TDR program in Center City Philadelphia
is a desirable civic objective because it will facilitate the
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preservation of Center City's architectural heritage. The
preservation of Philadelphia's historic architecture presents
innumerable and long-lasting benefits to the City, its
citizens, its businesses and its institutions. These benefits
are both economic and cultural , as landmark preservation
directs investment into Center City, defines Philadelphia's
identity in a positive manner, maintains exalted cultural
values, and is a resource for scholarship.
Among the economic benefits resulting from TDR
implementation will be the continued and enhanced appeal of
the City to tourists. The preservation of historic buildings
in Center City Philadelphia draws millions of visitors into
Center City, who bring money into the City, which stimulates
the local economy, provides jobs and creates tax revenue.
Among the cultural benefits resulting from TDR
implementation would be maintaining the presence in
Philadelphia of buildings designed in the era preceding the
World War I. This insures that the ambitious and infectious
idealism expressed in the designs of this era will continue
to influence thinking about design, craftsmanship, and culture
as a whole.
Historic architecture's usefulness to scholarship is also
indicative of its paramount cultural value, and this presents
a strong argument for the desirability of TDR implementation.
Historic architecture in Center City is useful for the study
not only of architecture, architectural history and historic
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preservation, but also of history, art, art history,
sociology, anthropology, planning, and engineering. Thus, the
City's architectural resources provide a rich visual
environment and field of study for students enrolled in the
City's numerous institutions of higher learning.
TDRs Transform a Preservation Liability into a Financial
Resource
Under current zoning, excess development potential is the
curse of commercially-zoned landmarks in Center City. TDRs
are desirable because they will transform the temptation to
demolish or irrevocably alter landmarks, the natural by-
products of existing zoning, into the desire to preserve.
Financial compensation for landmark designation will
improve the financial balance sheets of historic architecture,
as the money gained from the sale of development rights can
be managed by a reputable financial institution so as to
provide for, or at the very least, contribute to in perpetuity
the maintenance of historic buildings, which have higher
maintenance costs, lower rental rates, and lower net-to-gross
ratios of rentable space than newer buildings. TDR programs,
thus, make the prospect of maintaining an historic building
competitive with that of demolishing it and replacing it with
new construction.
In addition, the transfer of development rights from
historic buildings may lower the taxes on designated historic
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buildings, thereby further increasing their positive cash
flow.
TDRs Present a Method by viiich the Costs of Preservation are
Shared by Several Constituencies
TDRs are desirable because they ensure that the financial
burdens of preservation are shared among many different
interest groups, including developers, the landmark owner, and
the City.
Developers will pay the lion's share of the cost of
preserving landmarks that participate in the process. The
dollar amount that developers will pay for development rights
will depend on the value of commercial office space at the
time of the transaction, but certain guidelines may be set
forth to estimate dollar (in 1991 dollars) amounts that might
be transacted. The following table computes the estimated
value of one gross square foot of development potential to a
high-rise developer.
$ Per SF
Net-to- Rent Ex- Occu- Value of
Gross Gross Per pen- pan- Development IfHfear
SF Ratio SF ses cy Rights Value
1 X .8 X 25 X .5 X .863 = $8.63 X 10 = $86.3
1 X .8 X 20 X .5 X .863 = $6.90 X 10 = $69.0
1 X .8 X 15 X .5 X .863 = $5.18 X 10 = $51.8
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This table makes several assumptions, which are consistent
with those used in Chapter Two. The table assumes that:
the owner of development rights will sell them to
a developer of Class-A office space:
the net-to-gross ratios in the office building will
be 80%;
the Rent Per-Sguare-Foot will range from $15-25;
operating expenses (taxes, insurance, common area
maintenance, etc.) will egual 50% of gross income;
the occupancy rate will be 86.3%;
the saleable value of one gross sguare foot of
commercial office space is equal to its cash-flow
value over a period of ten years.
Based on these estimates of the value of one square foot
of development potential, an owner of 10,000 square feet of
excess development potential could sell them for anywhere from
$518,000 up to $863,000. Owner of 20,000 square feet of
development potential could sell them for over one million
dollars. Of course, it behooves owners of sending sites to
sell their development potential at times when the speculative
real estate market is most active, as profits will be greatest
at these times.
Thus, because the sale of development rights can generate
substantial sums of cash, the cost of preserving landmarks
will be born to a large extent by developers, as the monies
raised from such transfers could be managed for long-term
asset protection and used as building endowments for perpetual
building maintenance, or they could pay for a siibstantial
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renovation of the landmark at the time of the transfer.
Owners of historic buildings will still pay part of the
cost of preservation, however. Even with such sums paid to
them as are illustrated above, they will reap smaller profits
through a TDR Program than they would if they demolished their
diminutive landmarks and constructed high-rise office
buildings with maximum FARs.
The City of Philadelphia and its taxpayers will also
continue to pay for preservation to the extent that the
Historical Commission must be staffed. Even though the TDR
Progrsutt will be administered by the Philadelphia Historic
Preservation Corporation, at no cost to taxpayers, the
Historical Commission will still designate landmarks
throughout the City and will enforce preservation covenants.
However, the TDR Program spreads the burden of
preservation from two parties, the Historical Commission and
the landmark owner, to several parties, namely the Commission,
the lemdmark owners, PHPC, and the developer. Therein lies
a very desirable feature of this Program.
TDRs will ease the Conflict between the Philadelphia
Historical Coiaiiission and Landnark Owners
As is demonstrated in previous sections, TDRs present a
method by which the Historical Commission may designate
historic buildings with the assurance that affected landmark
owners will be promptly and substantially compensated for
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deprivation of air rights, as is illustrated in the preceding
pages
.
Since the effect of the TDR Program will be to improve
the cash position of landmark owners, relations between the
Commission and property owners should improve as a result.
TDRs Coinpensate for the Shortcomings of Existing Preservation
Legislation
TDRs are also desirable because they compensate for the
shortcomings of existing preservation legislation. Not only
is existing legislation inadeguate to remedy current
preservation dilemmas facing historic properties in Center
City, but the City's Preservation Ordinance presents
restrictions on landmark alteration and demolition only, and
the federal tax credits, which offer both restrictions and
incentives, have been difficult to utilize ever since the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. Therefore, the balance between
restrictions and incentives, which existed for a short period
prior to 1986, may be restored through the implementation of
TDRs. Not only can TDRs restore this balance, but the TDR
Program can be sustained without reliance on ever-fluctuating
federal tax laws.
Developers and Lcmdnark Otmers have sought Transfer
Transactions in the Past
Parties involved with high rise real estate development
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and owners of low-density landmarks have demonstrated through
past actions that the implementation of a TDR Program is
desirable. The list of Center City's informal transfers
presented Chapter Three already needs amendment, as Thirtieth
Street has been renovated by Gerald Hines Interests as the
trade-off for their future, proposed development of the air
rights above Amtrack's railroad yards. Furthermore, Arch
Street Presbyterian Church, at I7th and Arch, in the midst of
new high-rise development, has offered its development rights
for sale to certain developers, in an attempt to raise funds
to repair the badly-decayed, historic structure.
TDBs will improve the CoBmercial Environinent and the
Residential Quality of Life in Center City
The City's efforts to maintain its position as the
regional center of finance, law, insurance, architecture, and
other service-and information-based industries also
underscores the importance of implementing a TDR Program.
Historic buildings are valuable economic resources for these
industries because they provide an air of prestige, solidity,
and permanence which cannot be found in the same guantity in
any other office market in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
Additionally, historic buildings contribute substantially
to Center City's high residential guality of life. Because of
its high guality of life, it is one of the few areas of the
City that entices taxpaying and wage-earning residents from
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outside Philadelphia to move within the City limits.
Attracting new, tax-paying residents has been and will
continue to be a critical factor leading to Center City
Philadelphia's continued revitalization.
Thus, by preserving the historic character of Center
City, TDR implementation will contribute to the maintenance
and improvement of the City's quality of life and business
environment.
TDRs will facilitate the Development of the Urban Slcyline
TDRs are desirable because they advance not only the
cause of historic preservation, but also promote the
development of another civic assets, the urban skyline. TDR
implementation will enrich the urban skyline by permitting
developers to build to FARs that exceed base FARs. This will
result in the continued construction of buildings that exceed
Philadelphia's traditional height limits, thereby further
enriching the fabric of Center City, its quality of life, and
its aesthetic appeal to the business community.
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CX)NCLUDING REMARKS
At the writing of this thesis, the very existence of the
Philadelphia Historical Commission is imperiled. The owners
of 1908 Chestnut Street have successfully brought suit against
the City for the restrictions placed on alterations to and
demolition of the historic, art-deco movie house standing at
that address. Not only has the state Supreme Court ruled that
the City's process of designating properties results in a
taking by the standards of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but
also the damages that the City will owe the claimants may be
as high as $12 million, and the designation status of
approximately 13,000 designated structures within Philadelphia
remains uncertain.
In addition, the demolition of the three rowhouses at the
southeast comer of Ninth and Chestnut Streets is occurring
at this moment; the owner of both the Victory Building at the
northwest corner of the same intersection and of the PFSF Bank
at 7th and Walnut Streets is also pressing for approval of
pending demolition permits at this time; and a demolition
fence now encloses the historic structures at the southwest
corner of Seventh and Walnut Streets.
Clearly, the Historical Commission's coercive
preservation legislation is inadeguate to address the
preservation problem in Center City, where commercial property
values are as high as they are in any part of the City.
Although their effectiveness and ability to compensate
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landmark owners will vary according to economic climates, TDRs
represent a solution that is fair to landmark owners, that is
voluntary, that will disengage the Historical Commission from
these bitter disputes, and that will sustain the preservation
movement at a time when its very existence is imperiled and
when it lacks a mechanism to carry out its mission.
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